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SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL JUSTICE
WILLIAM ORTMAN*
ABSTRACT

Criminal procedure reform can be understood as a "second-best"
enterprise. The general theory of second best applies where an ingredient
necessary for a "first-best" ordering is unattainable. That's an apt
description of the contemporary criminal process. Our normative ideals of
criminal justice require fair and frequent trials to judge guilt or innocence,
but the criminal trial rate has been falling for at least a century; today it is
vanishingly close to zero. What may be even worse is how we've eliminated
trials-by endowing prosecutors with enough leverage to coerce guilty
pleas. Excessive prosecutorial leverage is the source of some of criminal
procedure's deepest pathologies.
This Article asks the reader to accept-as a thought experiment-that a
negligible trial rate is a constraint on criminal procedure reform in the near
term. From that starting point, the crucial question becomes whether there
is a less destructive way to ensure a negligible trial rate. There is:
inefficiency. The road to a more just, humane, and rational criminal process
could begin with making formal criminal litigation more inefficient. In
matters of institutional design, the general theory of the second best
counsels using unseemly practices, like inefficient procedure, to offset fixed
constraints, like the absence of criminal trials. If the formal process of
criminal litigation could be made unreasonably expensive for both parties,
both would want to settle to avoid it. Policymakers would then be free to
dismantle the tools of prosecutorial leverage-overlapping offenses,
draconian sentencing laws, punitive pre-trial detention, and more-without
worrying about increasing the trial rate. The result would not achieve our
criminal justice ideals-no second-best solution can-but it could be better
than the status quo. Without more trials, it may be the best we can do.

Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University. Many thanks to Sarah Abramowitz, Al
*
Alschuler, Steve Cleveland, Dan Epps, Tony Dillof, Katheleen Guzman, Peter Hammer, Peter Henning,
Sanjukta Paul, Jon Weinberg, and Steve Winter for helpful comments and conversations.

1061

1062

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1061

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IN TRO D UCTIO N ..................................................................
1062

I. THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT ............................................
1066

II.

PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS DISCONTENTS ......................................
1070

A . Plea BargainingToday ..........................................
1070
B . The Debate ...................................................
1073
1. Plea BargainingDefended......................................
1074
2. Plea BargainingAttacked .......................................
1076
a. CoercingDefendants to Convict Themselves ......................
1077
b. Suppressing Uncertainty.....................................
1078
III. THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT AND PLEA BARGAINING REFORM ............
1083
A. Making the Environment Less Coercive...............................
1086
B. Injecting A djudication...........................................
1089
C. D etecting O utliers ..............................................
1091
IV. TOWARDS SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ..........................
1092
A. The General Theory of Second Best .................................
1093
B. Second-Best CriminalJustice: The Civil Justice Model ..............
1096
1. The Basic M odel .............................................
1096
2. Approxim ating the Model .......................................
1099
C. Alternative Second Best: The Administrative Enforcement
M o d el ..........................................................
110 6
1. Comparison to Status Quo ......................................
1107
2. Comparison to the Civil Justice Model .............................
1109
C O N C L U SION ....................................................................
1110

INTRODUCTION

We have mourned the criminal trial for a long time. In 1928, Raymond
Moley wrote in one of the first academic treatments of plea bargaining that
the criminal trial was "vanishing." ' In the nine decades since, countless
writers have echoed Moley's observation.2 The time has come to consider
1.
See generally Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97 (1928).
2.
See Frank 0. Bowman, 111,
American Buflalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the Gradual
Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 226, 226 (2007)
("[The] number and percentage of civil and criminal cases that go to trial arc now so small that a cottage
industry has arisen to study the 'vanishing trial."'); see also SUJA THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN
JURY 2 (2016) ("Despite frequent highlights in media and pop-cultural displays in movies and television,
juries have come to play almost no role in the American Legal System."); Marc Galanter, A World
Without Trials?, I J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 7 12 (2006); Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the
Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. Sys. J. 338, 339 (1982); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978). See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S
TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2004).
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the possibility that the criminal trial is not dying, but, for practical purposes,
dead.
If the criminal trial is dead, the question confronting criminal procedure
reform becomes this: what's the best system we can have without trials? The
economists have a term for this scenario-it is a "second best," in which
one of the inputs required for an optimal ordering is unavailable. And they
have a theory-the general theory of second best-with insights about how
to design institutions under second-best conditions. 3 This paper deploys that
theory to plot a thought experiment about criminal procedure reform in a
"post-trial" world.4
Part I sets out the thought experiment's premise. Trial rates have been
declining basically since plea bargaining began ascending. During that same
period of time, however, nearly every other important feature of criminal
justice-incarceration rates, crime rates, etc.-moved both up and down.
From the juxtaposition of these two facts, I draw the tentative hypothesis
that plea bargaining, once introduced, operates like a one-way ratchet on the
criminal trial rate. This hypothesis cannot be proven, but the circumstantial
evidence is strong. If it is right, it implies that a low trial rate is a stable
feature of our criminal procedure, not some transitory characteristic. That
has an important, though unhappy, corollary-that criminal procedure
reforms that would require more trials are not likely to be adopted. I call this
the "trial constraint." The paper explores the trial constraint's implications.
Part II provides some background on the trial's vanquisher-plea
bargaining. It first explains the trial penalty, the mechanism that propels
plea bargaining.5 Next it examines the scholarly debate about plea
bargaining.6 Part I concludes by identifying two core objections to status
quo plea bargaining. Plea bargaining today transpires in the shadow of
overlapping offenses, draconian sentencing laws, and punitive pre-trial
detention, facets of our criminal law that add up to enormous prosecutorial
leverage. The result is a system where defendants are coerced to convict
themselves,7 and where, in many criminal cases (though not all), uncertainty
about guilt is irrelevant to punishment. 8
Part III confronts the extant literature on plea bargaining reform. Spurred
on by a pair of 2012 Supreme Court decisions taking courts deeper into the
regulation of plea bargaining than they had gone before,9 that literature has
See infra Section IV.A.
3.
See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L.
4.
REV. 2173, 2177 (2014) (coining the phrase "post-trial world").
5.
See infra Section ll.A.
See infra Section l.1B.
6.
See infra Section H.B. 1.
7.
8.
See infra Section lI.B.2.
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
9.
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flourished in recent years. That's a good thing. But many prominent
proposals for fixing plea bargaining would, if implemented, increase the
trial rate.' 0 Sometimes that's the express goal of a proposal, but often it is
an unstated yet predictable consequence. If the trial constraint described in
Part I is real, it implies that reforms that would increase the trial rate are less
likely to be adopted than they should be on their merits. "
Taken together, Parts I, II, and III form a conundrum. We know what is
wrong with contemporary plea bargaining (Part II) and, in theory, how to
fix it (Part III). But we do not know how to reform plea bargaining without
violating the trial constraint (Part I). Part IV turns to the general theory of
second best for help.
The general theory of second best, which originated in welfare
economics, provides that when one "ingredient" required for a first-best
optimum cannot be realized, it is generally unwise to keep the remaining
first-best ingredients at the levels they would take in the optimum. 2 That
sounds abstract, but the theory's implications are profound. When applied
to questions of institutional design, the theory often recommends practices
that are unseemly, as a matter of first principles, on the grounds that they
offset other unseemly practices. In a second-best environment, two wrongs
sometimes do make a right, or more precisely they make things less wrong.
The contemporary criminal justice system uses prosecutorial leverage to
eliminate trials. The general theory of second best invites us to ask whether
there is a better way to avoid trials. There is, and it is right in front of us.
In American courts, civil trial rates are about as low as criminal trial
rates.' 3 Yet in civil cases (generally speaking), no party is imbued with
unilateral leverage sufficient to compel settlement. How does civil justice
pull this off? Seeing a civil case through to judgment is enormously
expensive. While no one thing compels civil litigants to settle, the desire to
avoid the high costs of motions practice, discovery, pre-trial hearings, trial,
and appeal is a key driver. 4 The result is a system without many trials and,
in general, without one-sided leverage.
Part IV argues that the plea bargaining reforms discussed in Part III could
be made feasible by "logrolling" them with measures that make formal
criminal litigation more expensive.' 5 If criminal trials can be avoided
because they are too expensive for both sides, then policymakers could
10.
See in/ha Sections III.A III.C.
11. This is certainly not to say that existing proposals to reform plea bargaining are bad ideas. Many,
perhaps all, of the reforms discussed in Part III would make plea bargaining more just, rational, and

humane.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 208, 211 212 and accompanying text.
See in/ra Section IV.B.2.
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eliminate prosecutorial leverage while maintaining a low trial rate. And
while it would be difficult to make the criminal trial itself more expensive,
inefficiencies could be added on both the front end (with beefed-up motions
practice and discovery) and the back-end (by liberalizing interlocutory
appeals). The core idea of the thought experiment is to remake American
criminal justice in the image of American civil justice, not because
American civil justice is "first best," but because it would be better than the
coercive plea bargaining status quo.
The civil justice model is not the only possible path to "second-best"
criminal justice. Part IV also briefly considers a second approach, one more
analogous to enforcement in administrative law than to civil justice. 6 If
prosecutors could formally determine that a defendant is guilty, then they
would not need leverage to coerce pleas. And while such unchecked
prosecutorial power would (obviously) be problematic, it's plausible that
even an administrative enforcement-style second best would, in many cases,
be superior to the status quo. 17

In the end, this paper offers a thought experiment built from the premise
that a negligible trial rate is a fixed feature of our crirminal justice system. It
then explores how we might improve our criminal process while working
within this basic constraint. Lest there by any misunderstanding, I
acknowledge that the reform packages this paper describes will not be
attractive to reformers in the real world of criminal justice. They are not
really meant to be. So what is their point?
The visions of criminal adjudication this paper sketches are-judged
from first principles-unattractive. Yet, I will argue, they are the best
systems possible if we are stuck with the trial constraint, and they are at
least plausibly better than the status quo. If this is correct, either a
pessimistic or a constructive interpretation is possible. That a rotten second
best could be better than the status quo reflects very poorly on the status
quo, and offers (yet another) avenue for criticizing it. That is the pessimistic
reading.
The second-best models lay bare the shortcomings of any criminal justice
reform that conforms to the trial constraint. If the models are normatively
unacceptable-and I believe they are-the implication is that the way to get
to an acceptable criminal justice system is by shedding the trial constraint
16.
See infra Section 1V.C.
See infra Section IV.C. 1. Even if the administrative enforcement approach is better than the
17.
status quo, however, it falters in a head-to-head comparison with the civil justice approach. See infra
Section IV.C.2.
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itself. Fortunately, the trial constraint stems from politics, not some natural
order. The thought experiment's constructive reading-and its ultimate
ambition-lies in the hope that understanding the limitations of second-best
criminal justice will help ease the path towards resuscitating the criminal
trial.

I. THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT
For as long as we have the data to know, plea bargaining has relentlessly
chipped away at the criminal trial rate. After developing sub-rosa in the
second half of the nineteenth century,'8 plea bargaining was "discovered"
by criminal justice commissions and scholars in the 1920s.' 9 In 1928,
Raymond Moley examined the guilty plea rate in twenty-four urban
jurisdictions. 2' He found that guilty pleas accounted for between 33% and
95% of criminal convictions, with seventeen jurisdictions registering guilty
plea rates between 70% and 90%.21 From that starting point, guilty pleas
22
continued to rise (and trials to vanish) over most of the twentieth century.
Albert Alschuler reported federal guilty plea rates of 77% in 1936, 80% in
1938, and 86% in 1940.23 Though the federal trial rate ticked up briefly
during the middle of the twentieth century, it reverted to its usual direction
by the early 1980S. 24 In the closing decades of the twentieth century, the
trial rate inched ever downwards, with trials accounting for about 14% of
convictions in 1990, and 5% in 2000.25 We lack similarly definitive statistics
for the state courts but the same basic trends appear there as well. 26

18.
See William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 552 53 (2016)
(collecting sources).
19.
See FISHER, supra note 2, at 6- 7.
20.
Moley, supra note 1, at 105.
21.
Id.
22.
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice, Local Democracy, and ConstitutionalRights,
Ill MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1064 (2013) ("Guilty plea rates have been rising, more or less steadily, since
the Civil War or earlier....").
23.
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33 (1979).
24.
See Ronald F. Wright, TrialDistortionand the End of Innocence in FederalCriminalJustice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 89 (2005).
25.
See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola
University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1414 (2002).
26.
See Galanter, supra note 2, at 9 ("[Available data on state courts] provides a picture of trends
in the state courts that, overall, bear an unmistakable resemblance to trends in federal courts."); see also
T. Ward Frampton, Comment, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Wy) CriminalJury Trial Rates Vary
by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 191 n.48 (2012) (collecting sources). These aggregate figures mask
variation between jurisdictions, id., and between offenses. See generally Kyle Graham, Crime, Widgets,
and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content. Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573
(2012). But the aggregate picture is enough for present purposes.
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Criminal trials continued to disappear over the last decade, as criminal
justice took a turn towards reform. 27 According to data from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, trials accounted for 3.1% of
federal convictions in 2008, 2.5% in 2012, and 2.4% in 2016.28 Again we
lack precise measures for the states, but it is revealing that the three states
that decreased their imprisonment rates the most between 2006 and 2014California, Hawaii, and New Jersey-each had lower felony trial rates in
2014 than the three states that raised their imprisonment rates the mostWest Virginia, Nebraska, and Arkansas. 9 Though there are surely
complicated stories to be told about the trial and imprisonment rates in each30
state, it seems that recent criminal justice reform has not meant more trials.
Meanwhile, much else about the criminal justice system moved
cyclically. Since the 1920s (when extensive data on trial rates begins),
criminal justice has moved through periods of punitiveness and periods of
reform. 3' Incarceration has gone up, and, very recently, it has started to
27.
On the reform turn in criminal justice in the last decade, see generally Barack Obama, The
President's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 814 (2017) ("Thanks
to the dedicated efforts of so many in my Administration, the bipartisan push for reform from federal,
state, and local officials, and the work of so many committed citizens outside government, America has
made important strides."). See also sources cited infra note 30. But see Lynn Adelman, Criminal Justice
Reform: The Present Moment, 2015 WiS. L. REV. 181, 183 (2015).
28.
See U.S. District Courts Criminal Delendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and
Major Offense (Excluding Transf rs), During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2008,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics impo
rt dir/D04Dec08.pdf; U.S. District Courts Criminal Defendants Disposed of by Type of Disposition
and Major Offenses, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, STATISTICAL TABLES
FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/statistical-tables-federal-ju
diciary/2012/12/31; U.S. District Courts- Criminal Defendants Disposed of by Type o Disposition and
Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/stfjd4_1231.2016.pdf.
29.
For changes to state imprisonment rates from 2006 to 2014, see LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN &
JAMES CULLEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, UPDATE: CHANGES IN STATE IMPRISONMENT (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysi s/UpdateChangesinStatel mprisonment.pdf.
Trial rate information comes from the National Center for State Courts. Criminal Caseloads Trial
Courts, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSPIntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21,
2019). The 2014 felony trial rates for the states that decreased prison populations the most were 2.5% in
California, 4.7% in Hawaii, and 1.6% in New Jersey. The equivalent rates for the states that increased
their prisoner rates the most were 12.1% for Arkansas, 8% for Nebraska, and 6% for West Virginia. Id.
30.
The decline of trial rates over the last decade is consistent with a rhetoric of criminal justice
reform that has emphasized spending less on the criminal justice system, not more. See Mary D. Fan,
Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 634 (2012)
(arguing that criminal justice reform has been "made possible by the social meaning shift in viewing
harshness-mitigating measures as cost savings"); see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation,
66 SMU L. REV. 189, 205 (2013); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 27, 33 (2011); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis
in the Broader Criminal Justice ReJbrm Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2327 (2013); Ashley T.
Rubin, The Unintended Consequences of Penal Rejbrm: A Case Study of Penal Transportation in
Eighteenth-Century London, 46 L. & SOC'Y REV. 815, 845 (2012).
31.
See Bryant S. Green, As the Pendulum Swings: The Reformation of Compassionate Release
to Accommodate Changing Perceptions of Corrections,46 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 146 (2014) ("Criminal
justice scholars compare the historical shifts in justifications for imposing criminal sentences to a
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come down.3 2 Crime itself rose and fell.33 Impervious to these ebbs and
flows in the broader world of criminal justice, the trial rate continued
marching towards zero.
An uncomfortable hypothesis presents itself. Could it be that once plea
bargaining takes root, declining trial rates become an inexorable feature of
criminal justice? The hypothesis has a corollary-that whatever reforms
criminal justice policymakers might be persuaded to try, measures that
would materially increase the trial rate are not likely to be among them. I
call this the "trial constraint" on criminal procedure reform.
The trial constraint is a hypothesis about the behavior of criminal justice
policymakers. It conjectures that they will not be inclined to adopt reform
measures that would materially increase the trial rate. The hypothesis cannot
be proven, and I make no attempt to do so. The circumstantial evidence that
supports it is about a century of nearly uninterrupted declines in the trial rate
while much else in the criminal justice system fluctuated. This paper's
thought experiment proceeds on the premise
that the trial constraint is real,
34
at least in the short- and medium-terms.
To identify a political constraint on criminal procedure reform is
emphatically not to endorse the constraint as a matter of normative justice.
As Part IV explains, a criminal justice system with a negligible trial rate is
relegated to what the economists call "second best," but which we might,
without economic jargon, simply call unjust. But condemning it does not
make the trial constraint any more or less real.35
figurative pendulum that swings between retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment."). But see
generally PHILIP GOODMAN, JOSHUA PAGE, & MICHELLE PHELPS, BREAKING THE PENDULUM: THE
LONG STRUGGLE OVER CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017). For a history of criminal justice reform movements,
see generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From "Overcriminalization" to "Smart on Crime": American
CriminalJustice Reform Legacy and Prospects, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 597 (2011).
32.
See EISEN & CULLEN, supra note 29, at 1.
33.
See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL
OF CITY LIFE, AND THE NEXT WAR ON VIOLENCE 1 7 (2018); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory
Minimums and PopularPunitiveness, 2011 CARDOzO L. REV. DE NOVO 23, 24 (2011) ("Although the
United States experienced a dramatic increase in crime rates in the last half of the twentieth century,

more recent decades have seen reductions in those rates."); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Social Welfare and Fairnessin Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 51 (2010) ("Historical

reviews indicate that crime rates fluctuate over time and that many factors contribute to the variations.");
David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradoxof Severity in American CriminalJustice, 3 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 455, 462 (2001) ("But as the discussion above illustrates, that account is difficult to square
with the findings that our incarceration rates have mushroomed while crime rates have fluctuated and
that they have not stopped climbing even as crime rates have experienced a sustained decline.").
34.
But see William H. Riker, Implicationsfrom the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule fbr the
Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 446 (1980) ("[l]n the long run, nearly anything can
happen in politics.").
35.
Some readers may wonder whether the recently enacted First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-391, is inconsistent with the trial constraint hypothesis. For the reasons noted in the text, I wish that
it were. But while the First Step Act is indced a valuable "first step" in the overhaul of federal criminal
justice, it seems unlikely that it will have a material impact on the federal criminal trial rate. Although,
as I explain below, significant reform of mandatory minimum sentencing would likely increase the trial
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If the trial constraint plausibly exists, then its implications for criminal
justice reform are worth considering, and that is my task. For the most part,
I will bracket a related question-why American criminal justice
policymakers are (apparently) allergic to trials. Answering that question will
require another paper. Still, because the trial constraint's origins may bear
on the remedy, it is worth briefly identifying some possibilities.
One obvious root cause is that trials are expensive.36 As John Langbein
notes, "[i]n the two centuries from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth,
a vast transformation overcame the Anglo-American institution of criminal
jury trial, rendering it absolutely unworkable as an ordinary dispositive
procedure."3 Because the government must supply the prosecutorial,
judicial, and (often) defense resource for trials,38 policymakers' revealed
allergy to trials may be simply about saving money. If so, then perhaps the
real fixed constraint on criminal procedure reform is not about trials, but
costs.
Yet costs may not fully explain the allergy to trials. In every case where
39
a defendant enters a guilty plea, the state gets a conviction; it "wins."
Trials, on the other hand, expose the government to losing, and the public
embarrassment that comes with it. Perhaps policymakers constructed a
system for processing criminal cases (effectively) without trials in part
because that ensures that the government (effectively) never loses. James
Whitman argues that there is a relationship between the comparatively weak
American state and the harshness of American carceral practices. 40 Only a
strong state, Whitman explains, can show mercy. 4' Likewise, perhaps only
a strong state can permit the prosecution to lose a non-trivial percentage of
criminal cases. If so, the "harsh procedure" of coercive American plea
bargaining has a similar source as Whitman's "harsh punishment."
There is obviously much more to be said about these-and otherexplanations for the trial constraint. Yet medical doctors do not postpone
treating disease until they have a complete understanding of a malady's
rate, see supra at Part IllA, the First Step Act's mandatory minimum reforms were incremental and
modest. See Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 401 (2018) (reducing an existing mandatory minimum of twenty

years to fifteen years and an existing mandatory life imprisonment to twenty-five). Another piece of
criminal justice reform introduced during the 115th Congress, The SAFE Justice Act, H.R. 4261, 115th
Cong. (1 st Sess. 2017) did have measures aimed at plea bargaining reform, but it perished in committee.
36.
See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 2, at 350.
Langbein, supra note 2, at 9. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY
37.
CRIMINAL TRIAL 9 (2005).

See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM.
38.
L. REV. 601, 626 (1975).
39.

See Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,

2471 (2004) ("[Prosecutors] may further their careers by racking up good win-loss records, in which
every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being losses.").
40.
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 6 (2003).
41.

Id. at

1 15.
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origin. In the same spirit, I focus on the trial constraint's consequences for
reforming criminal procedure, leaving its root causes for another day.

II. PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS DISCONTENTS
In order to analyze the trial constraint's implications for reform, we need
firm footholds in the existing law and literature. Part II.A provides an
overview of contemporary plea bargaining. Part II.B then explores the
scholarly debate about plea bargaining's virtues and vices.
A. Plea Bargaining Today
The Supreme Court and criminal justice scholars agree: plea bargaining
"is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system."4 2 The numbers tell the story. Take the three largest statesaccording to data from the National Center for State Courts, in 2015 the
felony trial rates for California, New York, and Texas were 2.3%, 4.0%, and
2.1%. 4' Trials are even rarer in misdemeanor cases. The 2015 trial rate for
misdemeanors in Texas was 1.4%; in California it was 0.9%.' The same
patterns hold in the federal criminal justice system. In 2016 only 2.8% of
federal convictions resulted from trials. 4 Although defendants sometimes
plead guilty without an agreement-called an "open plea"-most guilty
pleas are products of some sort of agreement.4 6
Defendants who plead guilty give up valuable rights, as judges explain
to them daily in colloquies. 47 Why do the vast majority of defendants waive
42.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 144 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
43.
The reported data is available from 2015 Criminal Caseloads Trial Courts, COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP Intro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). If
anything, these percentages overstate the number of trials, as the National Center for State Courts
instructs jurisdictions to report a case as having been tried ifa jury is empaneled or, for bench trials, if
evidence is received. See State Court Guide to Statistical Reporting, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 38
(last updated Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State /20Co
urt%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting/o2Ov%202pointlpoint2.ashx. Thus, if a plea bargain
is reached during trial, the case is still counted as a trial.
44.
See 2015 CriminalCaseloads Trial Courts, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://popup.ncs
c.org/CSP/CSP-Intro.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). New York misdemeanor data is not available.
45.
U.S. District Courts CriminalDefendants Disposed of by Type of Dispositionand Offense,
During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY, https://www. useourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/stfj-d4 1231.2016.pdf.
46.
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participationin CriminalProcedure,81 N. Y.U. L. REV.
911, 912 n., 957 (2006) ("While not all guilty pleas result from plea bargains, most felony guiltypleas
do.").
47.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 78 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The very premise of the required Rule 11 colloquy is that,
even if counsel is present, the defendant may not adequately understand the rights set forth in the Rule
unless thejudge explains them."); see also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:Dicta About

2019]

SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL JUSTICE

1071

their right to have a judge or jury adjudicate their guilt under the favorable
beyond a reasonable doubt standard? One explanation is that the vast
majority of defendants are unambiguously guilty, and waiving a
preordained trial outcome is not much of a concession. This account has a
tough time explaining trial rates that approach zero. Trials are, after all,
unpredictable.4 8 Even for the unambiguously guilty defendant, a trial means
some chance of acquittal resulting from a prosecutor's blunder, a
sympathetic (i.e., nullifying) jury, or the discovery of a previously unnoticed
constitutional problem during the investigation of the case.
The better explanation for a near-zero trial rate is the existence of large
trial penalties-i.e., large differences between the sentences defendants can
expect after trials and the sentences they receive after guilty pleas.49 Without
some trial penalty, plea bargaining would probably not happen in any
significant numbers. 5 ° As trial penalties rise, guilty pleas become more
likely. A defendant who faces a fifteen-year mandatory minimum prison
sentence if he is convicted at trial is likely to accept a plea for time served,
Indeed, he is
even if the evidence against him is less than overwhelming.
5
likely to take the plea even if he is, in fact, not guilty. 1
In assessing plea bargaining as a method of criminal adjudication,
understanding the size of trial penalties is critical. Unfortunately, the true
size of trial penalties is effectively unobservable. 52 Prosecutors and
defendants negotiate over both the offense of conviction ("charge
bargaining"), and the sentence ("sentence bargaining"). Charge bargaining
is invisible to everyone but the participants, making it impervious to
Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1272 73 (2006) ("Numerous states have followed suit [with Fed. R.
CrimrL P. 11], requiring their courts to establish a defendant's understanding of the rights mentioned in
Boykin before accepting a guilty plea.").
48.
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining,101 IOWAL. REV. 609, 633 (2016) ("Even ina case

with a known quantum of evidence, there often remains an unknown, and largely unknowable, set of
possible trial outcomes.").
49.
See Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargainingand Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 920, 96162 (2016) ("The mechanism of inducement is the plea discount/trial penalty. Abolish plea bargaining,
and the trial penalty necessarily disappears.").
50.
See Albert W. A]schuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,Part 1, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1124 (1976) ("If we are truly committed to a bargaining system that can maintain the current
level of guilty pleas, we are also committed to a system in which defendants convicted at trial will be

sentenced more severely than defendants who plead guilty.").
51.
See generally Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant'sDilemma:
An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMtNOLOGY 1 (2013).
52.
Likewise, strictly speaking, empirical evidence cannot confirm that the difference between

post-trial and plea bargained sentences represents a "penalty" for going to trial rather than a "discount"
for pleading guilty. See Ben Grunwald, The FragilePromise of Open-FileDiscovery, 49 CONN. L. REV.
771, 804-05 (2017). That said, in a world where more than 95% of convictions are the result of guilty
pleas, it seems farfetched to suppose that post-trial sentences provide the appropriate normative baseline.
See Albert W. Alschuler, Latler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aidsfora Festering Wound PleaBargaining
after Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 702 (2013).
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quantitative research."3 Still, we can get some perspective on the size of trial
penalties by looking at studies on sentence bargaining. Using data on federal
sentencing from 2006 to 2008, Andrew Kim found a trial penalty
(attributable to sentence bargaining) of 64%.14 Nancy King and a team of
researchers found that the size of trial penalties in five states varied with the
type of crime and between bench and jury trials, but for most crimes and in
most states, defendants convicted at trial were more likely to be incarcerated
and for longer periods.5 5 For many crimes in King's study, moreover, posttrial sentences were multiples of post-plea sentences. In Maryland, for
example, defendants convicted of heroin distribution at jury trials received
sentences 350% longer than defendants who pled guilty to heroin
distribution.5 6 Other studies suggest that the trial
penalty assessments in the
5
Kim and King et al. analyses are far too low. 1
Even before we get to charge bargaining, then, trial penalties appear to
be significant. But the limitations of quantitative research notwithstanding,
there is every reason to believe that with charge bargaining, trial penalties
go from significant to overwhelming. Substantive criminal codes at the state
and federal levels, William Stuntz observed, "are filled with overlapping
crimes, such that a single criminal incident typically violates a half dozen
or more prohibitions." 58 The point of overlapping offenses and mandatory
sentences, Stuntz explained, is to present the prosecutor with "a menu from
which [she] may order as she wishes. ' 59 A prosecutor's discretion to choose
what charges to file, and what charges to threaten to file, is a principal
source of her control over criminal adjudication.6 0 Charging menus typically
53.
Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An EmpiricalAnalysis af the
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 Miss. L.J. 1195, 1202 n.22 (2015).
54.
Id. at 1254.
55.
Nancy J. King et al., When ProcessAffects Punishment: Differences in Sentences after Guilty
Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five GuidelinesStates, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973 -75 (2005).

56.

Id.at 973.

57.
See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongfil Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1133, 1169 (2013) (finding that trial penalties in two mass exoneration matters were between 400%
and 1300%); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargainingas Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining
Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 89 90 (2005).
58.
William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507

(2001).
59.
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal Law's DisappearingShadow, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
60.
Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty PleaAdjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV. 823,

858 (2014) ("The prosecutor has wide latitude to add, reduce, dismiss, or substitute charges during pleabargaining with little oversight."); Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes II: Personnel
Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors' Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 54(2012)
("Through their charging decisions, choices among case-ending options [including dismissal and plea

offers], and sentencing recommendations, they often become adjudicators of guilt and punishment, with
courts simply confirming their underlying decisions."); Lucian E. Dervan, BargainedJustice: PleaBargaining'sInnocence Problem andthe Brady Safety- Value, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 51, 61 (2012) ("The

key element of this machine, of course, is prosecutorial discretion and the ability to select among various
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include offenses with (relatively) lenient sentences at one end, and offenses
with severe sentences, often with mandatory minimums, at the other. 6 In
all but the most serious or high-profile cases, the prosecutors' incentive is
not to seek the most severe punishment available-an option that would
require a trial-but to threaten the harsh punishment to procure a guilty plea
to an offense lower on the menu.62 As John Pfaff explains, a prosecutor who
threatens a thirty-year mandatory minimum for using a gun in a drug deal
but promises to "make the gun disappear" in exchange for a guilty plea can
"terrify most defendants into agreeing. "63 The full trial penalty in the case
is the difference between the thirty-year mandatory minimum the defendant
faced after trial and the-presumably much lower-plea bargained sentence
for unarmed drug dealing.' This dynamic explains why mandatory
minimums, though rarely actually imposed, loom large over plea
bargaining.65
B. The Debate
Plea bargaining has spawned a vigorous scholarly debate, which this
subsection explores. This subsection also develops the claim that two deep
pathologies blight status quo plea bargaining-it coerces defendants to

criminal statutes with significantly different sentences."); Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2588 ("But given the
array of weapons the law provides, prosecutors are often in a position to dictate outcomes, and almost
always have much more to say about those outcomes than do defense attorneys.").
See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90
61.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 857 (2015) ("Prosecutors benefit from having amenuof broad laws
with mandatory sentences from which to choose because it gives them greater control over the
bargaining process and makes it more likely that defendants will cooperate with them to avoid
the mandatory term."); see also Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 971 (2009) ("Even in the majority of states that retain
indeterminate sentencing, statutory mandatory penalties and menus of overlapping crimes give
prosecutors the dominant role in setting sentences."); Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Efficts
of Depth and Distance in a Criminal Code on Charging,Sentencing, and ProsecutorPower, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1935, 1939-40 (2006) (proposing analytical distinction between depth and distance in criminal
codes).
Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2554. In homicide cases, Stuntz explains,
62.
prosecutors generally pursue every case they can, which is why the acquittal rate in such cases
is so much higher than for felonies generally. Cases cannot be dropped out of fear that the
defendants might win at trial; voters may forgive an acquittal, but they surely won't forgive
blowing offa homicide.
Id. at 2563.
JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
63.
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 132 (2017).
64.
See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 183, 188 (2014) ("While the federal sentencing guidelines fix a comparable discount for
,acceptance of responsibility,' the size of plea discounts in federal as well as state practice is in fact
effectively unregulated, because no law meaningfully limits prosecutors' discretion to add or dismiss
charges depending on a defendant's willingness to plead guilty.").
PFAFF, supra note 63, at 132.
65.
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convict themselves, 6' and, in some cases, it makes factual, legal, and
normative uncertainty effectively irrelevant to punishment.6 7
1. Plea BargainingDefended

Plea-dominated criminal justice has its defenders. The basic defense of
plea bargaining points to its efficiency. 68 Efficiency is sometimes cast in
moral terms-a defendant who is willing to preserve government resources
by admitting his crime, on this approach, deserves less punishment than one
who insists on trial. 69 More often efficiency is invoked to argue that plea
bargaining is welfare-enhancing in the same manner (and for the same
reasons) as ordinary contracts. Frank Easterbrook explained the welfaremaximizing benefits of trade in the context of criminal cases thusly:
The parties save the costs of trials. Defendants presumably prefer the
lower sentences to the exercise of their trial rights or they would not
strike the deals. Prosecutors also prefer the agreements; they may put
the released resources to use in other cases, thus increasing
deterrence. If defendants and prosecutors (representing society) both
7°
gain, the process is desirable.

66.
See infra Section II.B.2.a.
67.
See infra Section II.B.2.b.
68.
See Gilchrist, supra note 48, at 645 ("Plea bargaining persists for one reason: efficicncy.");
Traum, supra note 60, at 860 ("Champions of plea-bargaining view it as an efficient and cost-effective
system that affords defendants an important choice."); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The
Screening/BargainingTradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) ("Most discussions of plea bargaining
begin with the observation that plea bargaining makes the prosecutor more administratively efficient.");
John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: FactuallyInnocent Dejendants Who Plead
Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 163 (2014) ("Once thought to be a "necessary evil," plea bargaining
is now applauded as an efficient means of disposition."). Of course, one can believe that plea bargaining
is efficient without believing that this fact constitutes a defense of plea bargaining. As Darryl Brown
points out, the efficiency gains from plea bargaining "can perversely increase demand for criminal
prosecutions, rather than serving as a means to meet demand for enforcement that is driven by crime
rates." Brown, supra note 64, at 186 (emphasis omitted).
69.
See James Q. Whitman, Presumptionof Innocence or Presumptionof Mercy: Weighing Two
Western Modes of Justice, 94 TEX. L. REV. 933, 957 (2016) ("Indeed, we might believe that a manifestly
guilty defendant who insists on putting the state to the expense ofa trial deserves to pay the 'trial penalty'
that American criminal judges notoriously impose the harsh sentence, usually the maximum, visited
on obviously guilty defendants who refuse to submit to a plea bargain."); Gerard V. Bradley, Plea
Bargainingand the Criminal Defendant's Obligation to Plead Guilty, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 71 (1999)
("The pleading defendant also acts directly for the benefit of many individuals. In so doing, he further
evidences a changing character- a change for the better."); see also Alschuler, supra note 50, at 1083
n.82 ("Leniency for defendants who plead guilty is sometimes rationalized on the ground that a guilty
plea manifests.., a willingness to accept responsibility for one's conduct, on the ground that a defendant
deserves consideration for making conviction certain in a doubtful case.").
70.
Frank H. Easterbrook, CriminalProcedureas a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309
(1983).
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In their oft-cited article on plea bargaining as a form of contract, 7' Robert
Scott and William Stuntz emphasized that plea-bargained justice serves
both efficiency and autonomy ends.72 Both parties to a criminal case enter
with entitlements. The defendant is entitled to a trial, and the prosecutor is
entitled to seek the maximum sentence legally available.73 Sometimes, Scott
and Stuntz explained, "each party values the other's entitlement more than
his own." 74 When that happens, "the conditions exist for an exchange that
benefits both parties and harms neither."7 5
Scott and Stuntz's contractual defense of plea bargaining depends on the
invisible-hand rationality of self-interested negotiation.76 Another
sophisticated defense of institutionalized plea bargaining depends on the
guided-hand rationality of prosecutors. Gerard Lynch argues that our
criminal justice system relies on an "administrative" approach, by which he
means that for "most defendants the primary adjudication they receive is, in
fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor, who
acts in an inquisitorial mode." 77 A "Martian anthropologist," Lynch
postulates, "sent to observe criminal justice" on Earth would have
"relatively little to say about trials," but would identify the "substantive
evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the defendant's responsibility"
as being done in the prosecutor's office. 78 Lynch acknowledges that
prosecutorial adjudication departs from the "idealized model of adversary
that it is nonetheless a
justice described in the textbooks, 79 but stresses
80
cases.
criminal
process
to
reasonable mechanism

71.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1969 (1992)

(identifying Scott and Stuntz as having provided the "best defense in the literature" of"plea bargaining
based on autonomy and efficiency").
72.
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 42, at 1913.
73.
Id. at 1914.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA.
L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2010) ("The common ground [of invisible hand arguments] is that in every case

some good arises as an unintended byproduct of dccentralized action.").
77.
Gerard E. Lynch, OurAdministrativeSystem of CriminalJustice,66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2120 (1998).
Id. at 2121,2123.
78.
79.
Id. at 2121.
Id. at 2121, 2141 42. Maximo Langer agrees in part, arguing that prosecutors sometimes
80.
adjudicate unilaterally (which hc calls the Prosecutorial Adjudication System), but departs from Lynch's
normative assessment. See Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practiceand Reform of
ProsecutorialAdjudication in American Criminal Procedure,33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 26 (2006).
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2. Plea BargainingAttacked
Easterbrook, Scott and Stuntz, and Lynch notwithstanding, attacks on
81
plea-fueled criminal justice outpace defenses in the criminal law academy.
Many commentators have focused on implementation problems. For
example, critics point to cognitive biases and heuristics that prevent plea
bargaining participants (defendants, prosecutors, and defense lawyers) from
negotiating the sort of deals supposed by the "plea bargain as contract"
model.8 2 Many highlight the pincipal-agent problems stemming from
underfunded indigent defense.8 3 No matter how well-intentioned,
overwhelmed public defenders have strong incentives to plead cases in
order to move dockets along. 84 Principal-agent problems are not limited to
the defense, moreover. Line prosecutors may have interests not perfectly
aligned with their politically accountable superiors, and their superiors'
interests may not align perfectly with the public they represent. 85
Other critiques of plea bargaining center less on questions of
implementation than on questions of design. One such criticism, already
alluded to, is that excessive trial penalties lead innocent defendants to plead
guilty. As Darryl Brown notes, "[lt]here is little debate that pleading guilty
in spite of one's innocence can be a rational decision under the right
' 6
conditions, and the rules of plea bargaining aggravate those conditions." S
The "innocence problem" is among the most common complaints about plea
bargaining.87 On one level, this is understandable. No matter that false guilty
pleas are typically rational, they are deeply unsettling. 88 On another level,
81.

See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining,75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 706 (2001) (noting

the "lackluster support pica bargaining garners and the intense criticism it attracts").
82.

See generally Bibas, supra note 39.

83.
Id. at 2476 ("In some ways, defense representation is even more variable and vulnerable to
skewing than is the prosecution. One of the main culprits is funding.").
84.
Id. at 2477 ("To put it bluntly, appointed or flat-fee defense lawyers can make more money
with less time and effort by pushing clients to plead.").

85.

Covey, supra note 49, at 958 ("Prosecutors' interest in resolving cases do [sic] not neatly

align with those of the 'general public,' and arc influenced by a wide variety of factors, including
political considerations, professional advancement, and the desire to minimize workload."); see also

Bibas, supra note 61, at 963 ("Prosecutors are agents who imperfectly serve their principals [the public]
and other stakeholders [such as victims and defendants].").
86.
DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: How DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ
FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 92 (2016).
87.
See Gregory M. Gilchrist, PleaBargains,Convictions andLegitimacy, 48 AM. CRLM. L. REV.

143, 148 (2011) ("The objections that have been leveled against plea bargaining are numerous and
diverse, but most stem from a common problem: plea bargaining reduces the ability of the criminal
justice system to avoid convicting the innocent."); Josh Bowers, Punishingthe Innocent, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1117, 1119 (2008) ("Much has been made of an 'innocence problem' in plea bargaining.").
88.
See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence EJlect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 393 (2012)
("The argument against false pleading is based in part on society's moral obligation to prevent wrongful
convictions."); James W. Diehm, Pleading Guilty While Claiming Innocence: Reconsidering the
Mysterious Albrd Plea, 26 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 42 43 (2015) ("Most would probably prefer
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assessing plea bargaining is, like all questions of institutional design, a
comparative endeavor. The question is not whether innocent people plead
guilty, but whether innocence is necessarily a bigger problem in a criminal
justice system dominated by pleas than it would be in a criminal justice
system dominated by trials. While there are good89reasons to believe that it
is, we do not-and cannot-know with certainty.
The innocence problem may not provide a firm foundation for preferring
criminal adjudication by trial to criminal adjudication by plea, but two
further objections to plea bargaining do. They are explored in the
subsections below.
a. Coercing Defendants to Convict Themselves
Plea bargaining, when conducted under the thumb of hefty trial penalties,
coerces defendants (innocent and guilty alike) to convict themselves. 9 ° The
problem is two-fold: coercion and self-conviction. Trial penalties, and thus
plea bargains, are coercive when maximum penalties are inflated to ensure
that going to trial will be irrational from the defendant's perspective.9" The
defendant who can take a plea for time served or chance a fifteen-year
sentence after trial lacks a meaningful alternative to pleading guilty, and it
is hard to imagine (given the prosecutor's willingness to accept time served)
that the fifteen-year post-trial sentence on the books serves any purpose
other than to induce pleas.9 2 The pressure on the defendant to take the deal

to take the moral and ethical position that they will not in any way be involved in a situation where an
innocent client pleads guilty."). Cf Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual PlaceResponse, 157
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 261 (2008) ("No doubt, it would be a moral horror to permit innocent
defendants to plead guilty in a well-functioning and transparent criminal justice system.").
89.
See Bowers, supra note 87, at 1159 ("After all, trials are imperfect, particularly for recidivist
defendants who cannot so easily challenge wrongful charges."); see also RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE
ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 225 (2011) ("There are, in fact, numerous reasons to doubt that adversary
trials, as they are structured and conducted in the United States, are more reliable mechanisms for
producing truthful verdicts and sentences than robust plea bargaining.").
See, e.g., Albert W. Alsehuler, A Nearly PerfectSystem for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB.
90.
L. REV. 919, 928 (2015) ("Plea bargaining induces many innocent defendants to convict themselves.");
Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea BargainingPlea BargainingRegulation:
The Next CriminalProcedureFrontierSymposium, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2016) ("From
that baseline, current law tolerates what seems to be increasingly common: plea offers that are
functionally coercive."); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 762, 766 (2016) ("But because prosecutors do not inevitably desire to maximize punishment, plea
bargaining becomes a coercive process in which prosecutors use the threat of overly harsh sentences as
weapons for extracting guilty pleas from defendants."); Langer, supra note 80, at 250 ("When the
prosecutor makes her final coercive plea proposal, the prosecutor effectively convicts the defendant of
a specific charge or charges.").
91.
Concerns about the coerciveness of plea bargaining are widespread. See Ortman, supra note
18, at 555 56 (collecting sources). Not all agree. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 311.
92.
See Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1034 (2006) ("[T]hose who do take their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even
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is amplified, moreover, if he is incarcerated pending trial. 93 As John
Langbein memorably argued, the coercive logic of plea bargaining is
different in degree, but not in kind, from the medieval continental practice
94
of securing confessions by torture.
Of course, governments act coercively in many contexts that most find
unobjectionable, from taxes to compulsory military service to eminent
domain. Plea bargaining is different because it uses coercion to compel a
defendant to do the state's work for it. That the accused must convict
himself is a strike against his autonomy distinct from, though amplified by,
state coercion. 95 As Albert Alschuler explains, hinging a "substantial
portion of a defendant's punishment on a single tactical decision [to go to
trial or not]. . . assign[s] to the defendant a responsibility that he cannot
fairly be required to bear." 96 Langbein makes a similar point in comparing
the coerciveness of trial to the coerciveness of pleas: "Coercing people to
stand trial is different from coercing them to waive trial and to bring upon
themselves sanctions that should only be imposed after impartial
adjudication."97
b. Suppressing Uncertainty
There is a second deep objection to the plea bargaining status quo. With
outsized prosecutorial leverage, plea bargaining makes uncertainty about
whether a defendant is guilty less relevant-and sometimes irrelevant-to
punishment. That is because in a range of cases, the prosecutor can
unilaterally set the price of a plea without having to take uncertainties about
a defendant's guilt or innocence into account. This objection, which draws
on a point made by Stuntz,98 is less intuitive than the first and requires more
explanation.

Congress or the prosecutor might think appropriate, because the longer sentence exists on the books
largely for bargaining purposes.").
93.
Several recent empirical studies have found that "pretrial detention causally increases a

defendant's chance of conviction, as well as the likely sentence length." Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra
G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New DirectionsJbrPretrialDetentionand Release, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE,
A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2 (Erik Luna, ed. 2017); id. at n.5

(collecting studies).
94.
95.

Langbein, supra note 2, at 12 13.
David Lynch, The Impropriety of Plea Agreements: A Tale of Two Counties, 19 L. & SOC.

INQUIRY 115, 133 (1994) (describing plea bargains as the defendant's "safe but dehumanizing" option).
96.
(1981).
97.

Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 668
Langbein, supra note 2, at 13 n.24.

98.
Stuntz makes appearances on both sides of the debate. Compare text accompanying this note
with text accompanying notes 72 75. Indeed, Stuntz was responsible for one of the most influential
defenses of plea bargaining, Scott & Stuntz, supra note 42, and for one of the most sophisticated
critiques, Stuntz, supra note 59. To his enormous credit, Stuntz was open-minded and candid enough to
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Stuntz argued that when criminal codes are stacked with overlapping
offenses, pleas are not negotiated "in the shadow of the law."9 9 The point
can be illustrated graphically with an example borrowed (with some
modifications) from Stuntz.' 0 0 Assume a jurisdiction in which armed
robbery carries a mandatory ten-year sentence and unarmed robbery a fiveyear sentence. Assume further that prosecutors in the jurisdiction believe
that five years is the appropriate sentence for armed robbery, and that they
have discretion to charge armed robbery as unarmed robbery.
Figure 1
C

2'J

..0

..

13.

B

D.
A ...

0

F
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...........

50

-3

100

Strength of Prosecutor's Case (percentage)

In Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the probability that the
government would prevail at an armed robbery trial and the vertical axis
represents the sentence. Dotted line AB shows expected settlement values
if plea bargaining outcomes were determined in the shadow of trial
outcomes. The greater the government's chances of winning at trial, the
higher the expected punishment. Because prosecutors have determined that
five years is the appropriate sentence for armed robbery, however, the
expected settlement values for our jurisdiction are not shown by AB, but by
the solid line EF. So long as the government has sufficient evidence to bring
a charge, we expect a five-year plea deal.101 For any "strength of case" value
reconsider his published views. Id. at 2549 n.4 ("Even so, I think we [Scott & Stuntz] overemphasized
the role trials play and hence the role law plays -in plea bargains.").
Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2550.
99.
100. Id. at 2551.
101. Here, my model differs slightly from Stuntz's. Stuntz assumed that prosecutors only file
charges when they have at least a 75% chance of winning if the case went to trial. Stuntz justified this
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higher than 50% (point E), both the prosecutor and the defendant prefer a
five-year sentence to the expected outcome of trial, represented by AB. In
the terminology of negotiation theory, both sides have a BATNA (best
alternative to negotiated agreement) worse than settlement, implying
(setting aside barriers to negotiation) that they will settle. 0 2
Now assume that the jurisdiction changes the penalty for armed robbery
from ten years to twenty. Dotted line AC shows the new expected settlement
values if plea bargaining worked in the shadow of trial outcomes, while
solid line DF shows the new expected settlement values for our jurisdiction.
Despite the change in substantive law we still anticipate that all armed
robbery defendants will receive five-year plea deals. From this, Stuntz
concluded that for many crimes, the details of substantive law are unlikely
to affect plea outcomes.
Stuntz's point is important, but notice another feature of Figure 1: the
expected settlement values for our jurisdiction (DF and EF) are horizontal
lines. That means that so long as the strength of the government's case gets
to the threshold starting point (D or E, depending on the maximum
punishment for armed robbery), the strength of the government's case
ceases to be relevant to the plea outcome. If the strength of the government's
case does not reach D or E, the government will not file charges, but beyond
these points, it does not matter.
Now in plain English. In some criminal cases, the prosecutor is a price
setter, not a price negotiator.1°3 And in setting plea prices (unlike when
negotiating them) the prosecutor does not need to take into account the
strength of her case. 104

Several caveats are in order. Prosecutors can unilaterally set plea prices
only when substantive law supplies large punishment differentials between
available charges, and even then, only when prosecutors believe that the
lesser punishment level fits the crime. But is this generally true? (More
formally, do the Stuntzian conditions accurately describe American
restriction on the theory that "prosecutors in this jurisdiction operate under severe resource constraints."
Id. at 2552. The restriction, however, is unnecessary. There are many ways in which a prosecutor might
deal with resource constraints, and it is far from inevitable that dismissing robbery cases in which the
prosecutor could easily extract a plea would be a preferred strategy. I assume instead that prosecutors
will only bring cases in which they can secure a plea to their preferred sentence. Thus, if the strength of
the government's case would entail a settlement in the AE range, my assumption is that prosecutors
would decline to charge.
102. See FISHER, supra note 2, at 102; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to Guilty: Plea
Bargainingas Negotiation Notes, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 121 22 (1997).
103. Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty Pleas, 58 How. L.J. 437 (2015) ("In the guilty plea
state, prosecutors set the 'price' for plea-bargaining through charging decisions.").
104. See Wright, supra note 24, at 93 ("When a defendant faces a possible life sentence after
conviction at trial and the prosecutor offers to reduce charges, making possible a sentence of only a few
years, the resulting guilty plea is considered voluntary so long as the defendant says the magic words at
the guilty plea hearing. The strength of the defendant's available defense does not figure at all.").
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criminal practice?) Certainly not always. There are two categories of cases
in which plea prices surely are negotiated between the parties, not set by
prosecutors unilaterally, and thus where uncertainty does affect prices. The
first consists of criminal cases with high stakes, where the prosecutor's
objective is more likely to be maximizing the sentence." °5 In high-stakes
cases-think homicides and serious white collar offenses-the prosecutor
is unlikely to believe that the lower level of punishment associated with a
less serious charge fits the crime. When prosecutors seek to maximize
sentences, they cannot set the plea price unilaterally, as defendants have no
reason to voluntarily accept the maximum punishment. Thus, when the
stakes are high, plea prices must be negotiated in the shadow of probable
trial outcomes.
Second, the Stuntzian conditions may not apply (regardless of the stakes)
when the government's case is very weak. Consider once more the
jurisdiction depicted in Figure 1, where the statutory punishment for armed
robbery is thirty years but prosecutors believe that the appropriate
punishment is five years. Take the case of a defendant whose probability of
conviction at trial is only 10%. Perhaps prosecutors filed charges believing
the odds of conviction were much better, but subsequent developments hurt
their case. The "expected outcome" of a trial for the defendant is three
years-thirty years multiplied by the ten percent probability of conviction.
The prosecutor will be unable to insist on her preferred five-year plea price,
and will have to give the defendant an extremely favorable plea offer,
dismiss the case, or (least likely) go to trial. This is the sort of scenario that
gives rise to the "half a loaf is better than none" sentiment that Alschuler
found endorsed by an "overwhelming majority of prosecutors."' 06 "When
we have a weak case," Alschuler reports a prosecutor telling him, "we'll
reduce to almost anything rather than lose."' 07
High-stakes and very weak cases aside, there is good reason to believe
that across a wide range of criminal matters, prosecutors can and do set plea
prices. As Stuntz explained, "[p]lea bargains do not always, maybe not even
usually, involve haggling over a surplus as in negotiated settlements in civil
cases."' ' Gerard Lynch makes a similar point in more vivid language. The
"rules" in criminal cases, Lynch observes, "are more like those of the
supermarket than those of the flea market: there is a fixed price tag on the
case, and you will get no farther 'bargaining' with the prosecutor than you
105. See Epps, supra note 90, at 826 ("For example, murder is a particularly reprehensible crime,
and so prosecutors tend to have strong incentives to enforce homicide laws to their full limits. And for
this reason, the written law closely matches the law actually applied.").
106. Alschuler, supra note 50, at 223.
107. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 59
(1968).
108. Stuntz, supra note 59, at 2554.
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will by making a counteroffer on the price of a can of beans at the
grocery." 0'And, as we have seen, when a prosecutor has sufficient leverage
to set the price of a plea, she need not take the strength of her case into
account.
The "strength of the government's case" is the mirror image of
uncertainty about whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Such
uncertainty takes several forms: legal, where there is doubt about how the
law applies to the facts; factual, for example in cases of mistaken identity;
or normative, where there is doubt as to whether and to what degree a
defendant who is factually and legally guilty deserves to be punished. When
the "Stuntzian conditions" apply, uncertainty about the defendant's guilt or
innocence has no effect on the price of pleas. "0 An obviously guilty robber
in the jurisdiction represented by Figure 1 will receive the same level of
punishment (five years) as a person accused of robbery with a good, but less
than ironclad, mistaken identity defense, notwithstanding the latter's
superior prospects of an acquittal if his case went to trial.
Thus in a range of cases, plea prices do not take uncertainty into
account. 11But is that a problem? On one account, it would be useful if plea
prices never incorporated uncertainty." 2 If prosecutors could not give
favorable plea offers to defendants who might be innocent, those defendants
would be more likely to take their cases to trial, where some would be
acquitted. A system in which uncertainty never impacted plea prices would
109. Lynch, supra note 77, at 2130.
110. At least, not once the probability crosses the prosecutor's threshold for filing a case.
Depending on the magnitude of the most severe punishment available, that threshold might be below
50%.
111. A recent study by criminologists Shawn Bushway, Allison Redlich, and Robert Norris might
be seen as evidence against this claim. Shawn D. Bushway, et al., An Explicit Test o] Plea Bargaining
in the Shadow of Trial, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723 (2014). Bushway et al. asked judges, prosecutors, and
defense lawyers to evaluate the probability of conviction, the sentence the defendant would receive if
convicted at trial, and the plea price that they would find acceptable for a robbery scenario. Id. at 733
35. To test the relationship between the probability of conviction and the expected plea sentences, the
authors varied both the quantity and quality of evidence against the defendant. They found that for
prosecutors and defense lawyers (the story was more complicated for judges), as the probability of
conviction increased, so did the price of a plea. Id. at 739 -49. While the study is intriguing and offers
many insights, it does not disprove the claim that uncertainty about guilt can become irrelevant to plea
outcomes under contemporary conditions. This is because the scenario did not incorporate tools of
prosecutorial leverage. The defendant in the scenario was charged with only one crime first degree
armed robbery, carrying a maximum penalty of twenty-five years. See Shawn D. Bushway, et. al,
Supporting Informationfor "An Explicit Test of PleaBargaining in the 'Shadow of the Trial. "' WILEY
ONLINE LIBR. 9 (2014), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.111 I/crim.2014.52.issue-4/issuetoc. To
more closely mimic plea bargaining under contemporary conditions, the scenario could have included a
more serious charge e.g., attempted murder that a prosecutor could bring or threaten to induce an
armed robbery plea at the sentencing level that she preferred. Because the study omitted tools of
prosecutorial leverage, it cannot reveal whether a "shadow of trial" model fits a plea bargaining regime
overrun by such leverage.
112. This is the premise ofproposals to fix the size of trial penalties, discussed infra at notes 137
144 and accompanying text.
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thus convict fewer innocent defendants than does a system where
prosecutors can reduce a plea to almost nothing rather than risk acquittal at
trial. This logic, however, supposes that plea bargaining exists to sort cases
that can be resolved without trial from those cases that should be tried. And
perhaps that is how plea bargaining should work. But it is not how plea
bargaining does work. American plea bargaining is about processing cases
as quickly as possible, not correctly sorting defendants deserving
punishment from those who do not. 3 If the trial constraint identified in Part
I is real, that is not going to change.
To avoid convicting the innocent-or to minimize it, as errors are
inevitable regardless-would require adjudication. But our criminal justice
system's commitment is to minimizing trials, not errors. This is the awful
reality of "post-trial" criminal justice. In a post-trial world, the relevant
question is whether the innocent-or the plausibly innocent-should be
punished less than the unambiguously guilty? My view-that they shouldis based on a decidedly second-best morality. Of course it is "wrong to
convict the innocent." ' 4 But conditional on doing that, it is better to punish
the innocent less. On that logic, the suppression of uncertainty counts as a
deep pathology of the plea-bargaining status quo.
III.

THE TRIAL CONSTRAINT AND PLEA BARGAINING REFORM

As noted in Part II, plea bargaining has many critics in the criminal law
academy."' It should be no surprise, then, that ideas about how to fix plea
bargaining have proliferated. Reform has been on the agenda since at least
the late 1960s, when plea bargaining came under intense scrutiny. " 6 Early
reform efforts focused on abolishing plea bargaining,"' or, alternatively,
streamlining trials to make them cheaper and more accessible. "8 The trial
113. Alschuler, supra note 90, at 922 23.
114. Id. at 922.
115. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
116. See Alschuler, supra note 107, at 51 ("Most of these observers recognize that the guilty-plea
system is in need of reform, but the legal profession now seems as united in its defense of plea
negotiation as it was united in opposition less than a half-century ago."); see also Ortman, supra note
18, at 551.
117. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, Albert Alsehuler and Steven Schulhofer each
argued that plea bargaining should be rejected root and branch. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 937 -48 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1037 (1984). John Langbein likewise employed comparative analysis to show the feasibility of
criminal justice without plea bargains. See John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining:How the
78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 225 (1979).
Germans Do It,
118. Proposals to substantially curb plea bargaining by reimagining the criminal trial as shorter
and less expensive were offered by some of the leading abolitionists. See Alschuler, supra note 117, at
995 1023; Schulhofer, supra note 117, at 1082 86. More recently, Gregory Gilchrist has argued that
the proportion of criminal cases resolved by plea could be reduced (and the proportion resolved by trial
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rate's continued decline in the late twentieth-century confirms that neither
sort of reform gained any real-world traction. 19 Over time, the emphasis
shifted to smaller, more incremental reform. The pace accelerated when, in
2012, the Supreme Court issued a pair of decisions confirming that a
defendant may assert that his counsel's plea bargaining performance was
constitutionally ineffective. 2 ° Many observers saw these cases as "game
changers," 12 ' and, since 2012, dozens of books and law review articles
on
22
plea bargaining have generated a large array of reform strategies.'
The academy's renewed attention to plea bargaining reform is cause for
celebration, but an obstacle may be lurking within this growing literature.
Many prominent proposals to reform plea bargaining would, if
implemented, likely increase the proportion of criminal cases resolved by
trial rather than plea. Sometimes increasing the trial rate is the reformer's
explicit goal. Often, as we will see, it is the unstated but predictable
consequence of a proposal. Yet if the trial constraint is real, reforms that
would increase the trial rate will, at least in the near term, run straight into
it. That may not make the reforms impossible, but it means that they will be
more difficult than they should be on their merits.
This Section shows that scholarship on plea bargaining reform often does
not account for plea bargaining's seemingly unidirectional effect on the trial
rate. The implication is that the aggregate plea bargaining literature (or parts
of it) may have fallen prey to what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule call
the "inside/outside" fallacy. 123 The fallacy, which Posner and Vermeule
believe is common in public law scholarship,
occurs when the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint
increased), if prosecutors and defendants negotiate over specific trial rights. See Gilchrist, supra note
48; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel's Role in BargainingforTrialsEssays, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1979(2014).
Along similar lines, John Rappaport explained that "defendants can, and sometimes do, 'unbundle' their
jury trial rights and trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their
sentencing exposure." John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 181
(2015).
119. See, e.g., MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECLT7ORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 162 (1978) ("[T]o speak of a plea bargaining-free criminal justice
system is to operate in a land of fantasy."). Reflecting in 2013, Alschulcr observed that "[t]hc time for a
crusade to prohibit plea bargaining has passed." Alsehuler, supra note 121, at 706.
120. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
121.
1. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutors Turn, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2016). Not
all observers, however, were so enthused. See Russell D. Covey, Plea-BargainingLawAifter Lafler and
Frye, 51 DuQ. L. REV. 595, 608 (2013) ("In one sense, the Laflcr and Frye cases are 'no big deal."');

Alschuler, supra note 52, at 679 ("These remarks [lauding Lafler and Frye] bring to mind some notable
words of Justice Holmes: 'Oh bring in a basin."').
122. A partial list of these pieces can be compiled from the footnotes in this Section. Given the

volume of reform proposals and my inclination to keep this literature review relatively brief, my
coverage is illustrative, not exhaustive.
123.
Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743,
1745 (2013).
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of an analyst within the constitutional order, such as a political
scientist, and the internal standpoint of an actor within the system,
such as a judge .... In a typical pattern, the diagnostic sections of a
paper draw upon the political science literature to offer deeply
pessimistic accounts of the ambitious, partisan, or self-interested
motives of relevant actors in the legal system, while the prescriptive
sections of the paper then turn around and issue an optimistic
proposal for public-spirited solutions.' 2 4
Posner and Vermuele's sketch of the inside/outside fallacy fits the
(aggregate) literature on plea bargaining. At the level of description, the
literature demonstrates that criminal justice policymakers constructed a
system of plea bargaining that ensures that only a tiny percentage of
criminal cases make it to trial.125 But at the level of prescription, the
literature argues that these same policymakers should adopt measures that
would produce more trials. Combining the outsider's perspective for
description with the insider's perspective for prescription has helped to
preference of criminal justice
obscure a fundamental point-the revealed
26
policymakers to avoid criminal trials.'
The subsections that follow offer a taxonomy of prominent plea
bargaining reform proposals that would likely increase trial rates. I divide
these reforms into three categories: (i) proposals to change the coercive
background environment of plea bargaining, (ii) proposals to inject
adjudication into plea bargaining, and (iii) proposals to detect outlier plea
deals. 127 Within each category, we will see proposals that would likely-by
design or as an incidental consequence-increase the trial rate.
To be clear, when I argue that a plea-bargaining reform proposal would
lead to more trials, I am not objecting to the proposal's normative merits.
Many-perhaps all-of the reform proposals discussed in this section
would, if implemented, lead to a fairer, more rational, less punitive, and
ultimately more just process for adjudicating criminal cases. My protest

124. Id. at 1745.
125. See supra Section ll.B.2.
126. See supra Part I. My critique applies to the plea bargaining literature as a whole. I do not
mean to suggest that any of the individual pieces discussed in this Part is necessarily subject to an inside-

outside objection.
127.

The taxonomic exercise is reductionist (like all lumping exercises), but it reveals family

resemblances between reform proposals that may at first glance seem unrelated. Cf Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World. Some Splitting As Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REv. 471, 479 (2004) ("It is sometimes said that the two most basic

intellectual moves arc 'lumping' and 'splitting'--that is, finding relevant common characteristics that
allow us intelligently and usefully to group apparently distinct phenomena into a single category
('lumping'), and finding relevant distinguishing characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully

to separate otherwise similar phenomena into distinct classes ('splitting').").
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goes only to their prospects in a world where (as I have asked the reader to
assume) the trial constraint exists.
A. Making the Environment Less Coercive
The first set of reforms seek to change the coercive environment in which
plea bargaining happens. Reforms targeting coercion include:
a.
Eliminate Overlapping Offenses and Mandatory Sentencing. We
have already seen the effect of overlapping offenses and draconian
sentencing laws (including but not limited to mandatory minimums) on plea
bargaining. These are the driving forces behind large trial penalties, which
are in turn the driving forces behind the deep pathologies of status quo plea
bargaining. 28 Many in the criminal law academy have argued that
narrowing overlapping offenses and repealing draconian sentencing laws
are crucial, even necessary, steps in making plea bargaining a responsible
way of doing criminal adjudication.' 29 They get no quarrel here. '30
But such proposals come with a complication. Precisely because
overlapping offenses and severe post-trial sentencing laws are the principal
source of prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining, eliminating them ceteris
paribus would lead to more-perhaps many more-trials. Overlapping
offenses and draconian sentencing ensure that a guilty plea will (almost)
always be the dominant option for defendants."'3 Take out these features of
the substantive law and criminal adjudication would return to regular order,
where going to trial is sometimes better than negotiating a plea. An increase
in the trial rate is thus a predictable consequence of eliminating overlapping
offenses and repealing draconian sentencing laws.
b.
Bail Reform. Next to overlapping offenses and mandatory
sentencing, pretrial detention may be the leading source of coercion in plea
bargaining, particularly in low-level cases involving defendants who cannot

128. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political
Dynamics andA Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 465 (2009) (proposing reinvigorated
merger doctrine as a check against overlapping offense); Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to
Reversing Mass Incarceration:Refbrining the Law to Reduce ProsecutorialPower in Plea Bargaining,
15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191, 194 (2015) ("Legislative change alone will not
reverse mass incarceration, but targeted legislative reform could help to change the overly coercive
atmosphere of plea bargaining."); Covey, supra note 49, at 968 ("Undoubtedly, a major source of pleamarket distortion stems from the oversupply of penal leniency that is a product of draconian sentencing
laws and prosecutorial discretion. Reducing this oversupply is critical to establishing a fairer plea market

equilibrium."); Langer, supra note 80, at 287 ("Commentators and policy-makers have made important
proposals to advance these goals that include clarifying definitions and reducing the number and overlap

of criminal offenses ....
").
130.

See infra Part IV.

131.

In the language of negotiation theory, they ensure that prosecutors and defendants in many

cases have BATNAs worse than settlement. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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afford to post bail.'32 As Alexandra Natapoff observes, "many arrestees
plead guilty to petty offenses in exchange for a sentence of time served as a
way of terminating what might otherwise be a longer period of incarceration
'
Reformers have proposed reducing or even
than the offense carries."133
of easing the pressure on
eliminating the use of monetary bail as a means
34
defendants in low-level cases to plead guilty.'
These reforms get no quarrel from me either. But again, consider their
likely effect on the trial rate. In a sophisticated empirical study comparing
case outcomes for detained and released defendants in two large urban
counties, Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, and Crystal Yang found evidence for
the common-sense proposition that defendants released before trial have
stronger negotiating positions vis-A-vis prosecutors than in-custody
defendants.' 3 5 For many defendants, that likely translates into a better plea
deal, not a trial. But for some portion of defendants, pretrial release will
make the difference between having a BATNA better than the prosecutor's
plea offer or not. In other (less jargony) words, there are surely in-custody
defendants in low-level cases currently pleading guilty to avoid prolonged
pre-trial detention who would, if released, decide to contest the charges. If
36
so, bail reform that reduces pre-trial detention entails more trials.'
c.
Trial Penalty Caps. Another proposal to curtail coerciveness is to
place explicit caps on trial penalties.' 31 Such caps could take the form of
"fixed discounts," where defendants who plead guilty are entitled to a
specific "discount" off the sentence they would have received after trial, and

132.

See Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor PretrialDetention,

69 STAN. L. REV. 715 (2017) ("For misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial, the worst
punishment may come before conviction. Conviction generally means getting out ofjail; people detained

on misdemeanor charges are routinely offered sentences for 'time served' or probation in exchange for
tendering a guilty plea."); Will Dobbic et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 236
(2018) ("We find that pre-trial release significantly decreases the probability of conviction, primarily
through a decrease in guilty pleas.").
133. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1322 (2012).
134. See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 93, at 7 ("Reducing reliance on monetary bail is a
central goal of many pretrial reform advocates."); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S.
SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 13 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploa
ds/j usticepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf.
135. Dobbie et al., supra note 132, at 234.
136. That does not, of course, mean that it will be impossible, but only that it will be more difficult
than it should. Indeed, recent bail reform efforts have already begun to show results. See, e.g., Susan N.
Herman, Getting There: On Strategies for Implementing Criminal Justice Reform, 23 BERKELEY J.
CRiM. L. 32, 58 (2018); Devin Tasef, Note, The Illinois Bail Refbrm Act of)2017: Roadmap to Reform,
or Reform in Name Only?, 38 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 528, 531 (2018).
137. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1245 n.30 (2008).
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not more.' 38 Or, as Russell Covey has suggested, a trial penalty cap could
instead be a "ceiling" on post-trial sentences, where the maximum sentence
a defendant could receive after trial is based on a fixed multiplier of the
most favorable plea offer he had received. 139 Covey persuasively argues that
an enforceable cap on trial penalties would transform plea bargaining,
40
making it less coercive and more protective of innocent defendants.
But consider what a trial penalty cap would do to trial rates. Covey
allows that a cap would affect the mix of cases that make it to trial."41 Indeed,
that is one of its virtues. An enforceable cap prevents prosecutors from
giving extremely lenient plea offers to defendants in cases where the
evidence is weak; as a result, the cases more often go to trial, and, some
portion of the time, innocent defendants are acquitted.142 A modest trial
penalty cap does more than change the mix of cases, however. 143 It would
also change the overall trial rate. "' The "weak evidence" cases that a trial
penalty cap would route to trial are cases that are currently not going to trial.
Unless a trial penalty cap would offset that by dissuading the few defendants

138. Id. In a similar vein, Oren Gazal-Ayal proposes a "partial ban" on plea bargaining, which
would "restrict
sentence concessions to a certain percentage of the post-trial sentence." Oren GazalAyal, PartialBan on Plea Bargains,27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2295, 2313 (2006).
139. Covey, supra note 137, at 1242. Covey argues that a ceiling on trial sentences would be more
effective than a fixed discount on pleas because discounts arc "easily evaded through substitute
bargaining mechanisms, including charge and fact bargaining, and most fixed-discount proposals
provide few effective mechanisms to prevent the parties from engaging in alternative bargaining." Id. at
1260. Covey's criticism of fixed discounts is surely correct. See Jenia lontcheva Turner, Plea
Bargaining,in 3 ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
88 90 (Erik Luna ed., 2017. But trial sentence ceilings, Covey's alternative, are just as easily
circumvented: prosecutors need only condition the making of an offer on its acceptance. Covey
recognizes this and argues that "prosecutors should not be permitted to make the extension of a plea
offer contingent on its acceptance." Covey, supra note 137, at 1273. It is unclear, however, how such a
principle could be enforced.
140. Covey, supra note 137, at 1245.
141. Id. at 1250.
142.
Id.at 1250-51.
143. The proponents of this reform favor a "modest" cap. See id. at 1242 ("Pursuant to theceiling,
no defendant could receive a punishment after trial that exceeded the sentence he could have had as a
result of a plea offer by more than a modest predetermined amount."); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1560- 61 (1981) (proposing "relatively
modest, prescribed sentencing concession often or twenty percent of the sentence received for a guilty
plea"); see also Wright, supra note 24, at Ill ("The trial distortion theory, therefore, promotes guilty
plea negotiations and sentence practices that offer only modest plea discounts to defendants.").
144. To be sure, theoretically there is some fixed trial penalty that would be large enough to ensure
no overall increase in the trial rate. As Schulhofer notes, with a sufficient explicit trial penalty, "a
jurisdiction could retain control over its guilty plea rate and preserve its.., level ofresources committed
to trials." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2004 (1992).
Schulhofer's point is tre in theory and perhaps was even practical in 1992, when trial rates were around
10%. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. But what sort of explicit trial penalty would be required
to preserve current rates? Considering the size of status quo trial penalties, see supra notes 54 57 and
accompanying text, a "modest" penalty probably would not suffice.
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who are currently opting for trial from doing so-and there is no obvious
reason why it would-it would likely increase the overall trial rate.
B. Injecting Adjudication
As we have seen, many critics, and even some supporters, believe that
plea bargaining is tantamount to conviction without adjudication.' 45 A
second set of reform proposals seek to inject meaningful adjudication into
the plea process.
External Review. Some reformers propose to supplement the existing
plea process with review by a body independent of the prosecutor-defender46
judge workgroup. Laura Appleman's "plea jury" proposal is illustrative.'
To infuse adjudication and participatory democracy into a plea bargaining
regime that lacks it, Appleman would require, as a precondition to any plea,
that a jury determine: "(1) whether the facts stated fit the alleged crime; (2)
whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) and whether the proposed
sentence was appropriate."' 47 Appleman explains that this would "inject
some genuine adjudication into our system of plea bargains, something that
is badly needed."' 48
Appleman recognizes that running guilty pleas through the gauntlet of
jury review "might make for slower processing of defendants to jail, prison,
or probation."' 49 But that would not be the plea jury's only effect on criminal
case processing; jury review of pleas would also lead to more trials. Unless
the plea jury merely rubber-stamped deals negotiated by the parties-in
which case it would not serve the purposes Appleman sets out for it-it
would, in some cases, find that the facts stated did not fit the alleged crime,
that the plea was not knowing and voluntary, or that the proposed sentence
was not appropriate.
Sometimes, as Appleman suggests, the parties would then return to the
50
negotiating table and come back with a new deal that satisfied the jury.
In those cases the jury's rejection of the initial deal would affect only a
plea's price. But in some cases-the proportion is unknowable-the plea

145. See supra Section lI.B.
146. Laura 1. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010). Additional reforms along these
lines include Roger Fairfax's proposal to make grand juries the independent reviewers of pleas. Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., Thinking outside the Jury Box: Deploying the GrandJury in the Guilty Plea Process, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395 (2016), and John Blume and Rebecca Helm's citizen review panels, which
would evaluate post-conviction innocence claims by prisoners who pled guilty. Blume & Helm, supra

note 68, at 186. Such panels, Blume and Helm contend, would counteract plea bargaining's innocence
problem.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Appleman, supra note 146, at 748.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 768.
Id.at749.
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jury's refusal to accept a negotiated plea would necessitate a trial.151
Engrafting a plea jury onto the plea process means that some cases that are
52
currently resolved by plea would have to be resolved by trials.'
Hard Screening. In a classic article, Ronald Wright and Marc Miller
propose a different mechanism for injecting adjudication into criminal
procedure. Adjudication, they contend, need not come from "external
reviewers," such as judges or juries, but can instead take place "within the
[prosecutor's] office." 53 They contend that the traditional "alternatives" to
plea bargaining-abolishing pleas or shortening trials 54 -miss a viable
prosecutorial strategy: thorough pre-charge prosecutorial screening
combined with a firm refusal to negotiate reductions after charges are filed.
The strategy, which they label "hard screening," allows prosecutors to
reduce or eliminate plea "bargaining," in the sense of deals that are actively
haggled for between prosecutor and defendant. Through hard screening,
Wright and Miller argue, prosecutors can avoid the most unpleasant aspects
55
of plea bargaining in a cost-effective manner.
But what of hard screening's consequences for trial rates? Because
prosecutors will have eliminated the weakest cases before filing charges, it
is likely that more defendants would enter open guilty pleas than in
jurisdictions without hard screening. If the evidence against the defendant
is overwhelming, there may be little point to undergoing the ordeal of trial,
especially if the defendant must pay his own attorneys. But it seems unlikely
that all defendants who could be persuaded to plead guilty via bargaining
would accede to an open plea under hard screening. Where prosecutors
refuse to negotiate reductions after charges are filed, defendants who stand
a reasonable prospect of acquittal have a powerful incentive to forge ahead
to trial.
That hard screening entails more trials is not just a matter of speculation.
Wright and Miller grounded their analysis in detailed data from the office
of former New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr.' 56 Immediately
after Connick took office and implemented hard screening, the number of
trials in New Orleans exploded. In the final year of Connick's predecessor's
tenure, the district attorney's office tried 190 cases. By the third year of

151.
Appleman acknowledges as much, noting that when the jury rejects a plea, "the defendant
could back out of the plea deal entirely and take his chances with a trial." Id. at 749.

152.

Appleman notes that "[t]he reality of the modern criminal justice system prevents any

increase injury trials... " Id. at 761.
153.
Wright & Miller, supra note 68, at 49.
154. See supra notes 117 118 and accompanying text.
155.
Wright & Miller, supra note 68, at 57 58.
156.
Id. at 59.
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Connick's term, the number was over one-thousand, and it remained57
"around the same level of up to 1,000 per year" for the next twenty years.
C. Detecting Outliers
A third category of plea bargaining reforms consists of measures meant
to detect outlier plea bargains produced by bad lawyering, cognitive biases,
prosecutorial overreach, and more. Perhaps the most prominent of these is
the proposal of Stephanos Bibas (then a law professor and now a judge on
the Third Circuit) to combat the "chronic misunderstandings and
58
irrationality" in plea bargaining via consumer protection-style regulation.
For example, to counteract the pressure that defendants feel to plead guilty,
Bibas suggests a "cooling-off period for plea bargains authorizing five
years' imprisonment or more."'' 59 Bibas also offers a range of consumer
protection-style disclosure requirements that would "give defendants fair
warnings of the sentences they are likely to receive in exchange for their
pleas." 60 Like consumer protection laws, Bibas's plea bargaining rules
would ensure that defendants not hastily enter pleas based on an incomplete
or faulty understanding of the terms.
If one's goal is to construct a more humane, rational, and just plea
bargaining system, Bibas's ideas are clearly good ones. Why, then, hasn't
consumer protection-style regulation flooded the plea bargaining zone? The
trial constraint suggests an explanation.

157. Id. at 76. Wright and Miller acknowledge that "[t]raditional assumptions about the plea
bargain/trial tradeoffwould predict an increase in trials from a decrease in plea bargains," but argue that
"we have shown that the traditional assumptions are misguided, and the actual effect on trial rates of
implementing the screening/bargaining tradeoff is hard to predict." Id. at 59. Wright and Miller show
that the traditional assumptions about how prosecutors can respond to plea bargaining are misguided.
Yet two other key players -defendants and judges must also be considered. As noted in the text,
defendants in hard screening jurisdictions have more reason than defendants in traditional plea
bargaining jurisdictions to insist on trial. Still, as Wright and Miller point out, a hard screening regime
could maintain a negligible trial rate ifjudges sentence defendants who go to trial much more harshly
than defendants who plead guilty. Id. at 75-76. But if so, hard screening merely substitutes one form of
coercive plea bargaining for another. That is, hard screening with judicially imposed trial penalties
converts plea bargaining from a practice that plays out between prosecutors and defendants behind
closed into a practice that involves judges and defendants communicating with winks and nods. That is
how Gerard Lynch interpreted Wright and Miller's data from New Orleans. Connick's hard screening
policy did not actually eliminate plea bargaining in New Orleans, Lynch observed, but rather turned it
into an "implicit bargain between defendants and judges," through which "defendants who plead guilty
receive an imprecise, unannounced, yet roughly predictable sentencing discount from judges in
exchange for their waiver of rights." Gerard E. Lynch, Screening versus Plea Bargaining:Exactly What
Are We TradingOff?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2003).
158. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1152 (2011).
159. Id. at 1155.
160. Id. at 1156. For a related reform proposal, see Covey, supra note 49, at 964 (arguing for
"[biargaining at the retail, rather than the wholesale, level").
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For all the similarities that Bibas points out between consumers and
defendants, they differ in the most critical dimension. When a company
makes a legally-mandated disclosure that persuades a would-be consumer
not to do business with the company, the would-be consumer walks away.
The consumer protection law has done its work, and the person is no longer
a would-be consumer. When a prosecutor or judge makes a legallymandated disclosure to a defendant that dissuades the defendant from
pleading guilty, the defendant is still a criminal defendant. Bibas's rule has
done its job, except now, unless the prosecutor or judge can find a way to
put the broken deal back together, he is a defendant heading for trial.
Consumer protection-style rules governing plea bargaining would dissuade
some defendants from pleading guilty and push them to insist on trials. As
such, the trial constraint implies that policymakers are unlikely to adopt
them. Is that just? Of course not. It is wretched that maintaining a negligible
trial rate depends on forcing some half-informed defendants to make hurried
decisions with only a dim sense of the consequences. But that is the
pathological structure of our criminal process.

IV. TOWARDS SECOND-BEST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The first three Parts add up to an impasse. Part I described two deep
objections to status quo plea bargaining-it coerces defendants to convict
themselves and in many cases (though not all) it renders uncertainty
irrelevant to punishment. The reform measures described in Part III would
ameliorate these status quo pathologies. Indeed, because they curtail
prosecutorial leverage, the proposals discussed in Section III.Aeliminating overlapping offenses and draconian sentencing, reforming pretrial detention, and/or capping trial penalties-might even be necessary
steps in constructing a reasonable plea bargaining system. Yet the reforms
described in Part III-especially those targeting prosecutorial leveragewould likely increase the trial rate. If the trial constraint posited in Part I is
real, that means that the Part III reforms will be unduly difficult to
accomplish in the near-term.
This Part explores a "second best" way out of the impasse. Specifically,
this Part shows that if we want to make the plea bargaining reforms
discussed in Part III feasible, we could combine them with reforms that
would simultaneously make formal criminal litigation inefficient. The logic
comes from the general theory of second best. Efficient criminal procedure
would be part of "first best" criminal justice, but if strategic inefficiency
could make criminal trials undesirable to both sides, then prosecutorial
leverage could be eliminated without increasing trial rates. The idea is to
make American criminal justice more like American civil justice, which

I
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achieves trial rates comparable to the criminal justice system without
(typically) giving overwhelming leverage to any party. 161 The "civil justice"
model of reform would not lead to a first-best system--few familiar with
American civil justice would contend that it deserves such acclaim-but it
could be less pathological than the status quo.
Beyond the civil justice model, this Part also briefly considers an
alternative second-best strategy. If prosecutors were empowered to formally
determine that a defendant is guilty (perhaps subject to some form of afterthe-fact judicial review), they would not need leverage to coerce pleas. I call
this the "administrative enforcement" second best, as it bears a loose
resemblance to enforcement in administrative law. I argue that while the
administrative enforcement second best is still plausibly better than the
status quo in many cases, it is inferior to the civil justice model.
This Part proceeds in three sections. Section IV.A introduces the general
theory of second best and its application to questions of institutional design.
Section IV.B identifies and analyzes a second-best model of criminal justice
based on making formal criminal procedure less efficient. Finally, Section
IV.C considers, but ultimately rejects, a second best model of criminal
justice patterned on administrative enforcement.
A. The General Theory of Second Best
If the trial constraint is real, and American criminal justice is stuck with
a negligible trial rate, the logic of second best comes into play. The general
theory of second best provides that when one of the inputs necessary to a
Pareto (or "first-best") optimum is unavailable, it is usually foolish to try to
get all of the other inputs that the optimum would include. 62 As the theory's
progenitors, economists Lipsey and Lancaster, explain more formally,
"[g]iven that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled,
then an optimum situation can be achieved only by departing from all the
other Paretian conditions." ' ' 3 The theory has important implications for
institutional reform. When the ingredients necessary for an optimal
institutional ordering are attainable, reformers ought to focus on attaining

161. See infra Section IV.B.2.
162. See generally Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4,
17- 18 (2009) (introducing general theory of second best); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional
PossibilitiesEssay, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 311 12 (2008) (same); Thomas S. ULen, Courts, Legislatures, and
the General Theory of Second Best in Law and Economics, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 189, 192 96 (1998)
(same); Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structurefor Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our WorseThan-Second-Best World: A Proposaland Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of
Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 950, 967 76 (1975) (same).
163. R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD.
11, 11 (1956).
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them. But when one of them becomes unavailable, reformers should refrain
from chasing the rest.
Though developed in welfare economics, the theory of the second best
"generalizes easily" to matters of law, policy, and institutional design."6 In
these domains, the theory often implies that a social policy (or law,
institution, etc.) that is undesirable on first principles might be usefully
checked by a second policy that is also, on first principles, undesirable.165
This is because the relationship between policies is interactive rather than
additive. 166 For example, Jon Elster, drawing on Tocqueville, notes that
ancien regime France had three governance features that were, at first
glance, objectionable: (i) "the royal administration had wide, ill-defined,
and arbitrary powers," (ii) "venality of office made bureaucracy
impossible," and (iii) the "obstruction of ... highly politicized courts...
' Yet, Elster observes, one
made it difficult to pursue consistent policies."167
could argue-and Tocqueville did-that in light of the first feature, the
68
others were useful checks on monarchial abuse.
Bruce Coram has explained that applying the theory of second best to
questions of institutional design involves a difficulty that applying it to
economic questions usually does not: "choosing an appropriate standard for
' That is, unlike in economics, where
the first best."169
maximizing welfare is
the agreed-upon goal, the designers of social and political institutions lack
a shared objective. This requires a "flexible" application of the theory,
Coram explains: "The most natural application of the first best in cases of
non-market institutions would be to use it to refer to the set of rules being
used for the model of the best arrangement."' 7 ° The first best, a "simplified
model of mechanisms and outcomes that has been constructed under certain
assumptions about information or preference revelation," can then be used
in the "general sense of an ideal, or benchmark, or unit of comparison, that
has to be specified for each case."''

164.
Vermeule, supra note 162, at 18; see also Robert E. Goodin, PoliticalIdeals and Political
Practice,25 BRIT. J. OF POL. Sci. 37, 53 (1995) ("In its original application, of course, the general theory
of second best was devised by economists for application to economics."); Juha Raikki, The Problem
of the Second Best: Conceptual Issues, 12 UTILITAS 204, 204 (2000) ("The problem of the second best

is not limited to economics alone.").
165.

Vermeule provides numerous examples. See Vermeule, supra note 162, at 18 23.

166.

Id. at 18 ("Because the variables interact, a failure to attain the optimum in the case of one

variable will necessarily affect the optimal value of the other variables.").
167. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NuTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 440 (2007); see also Vermeule, supra note 162, at 18 (citing Elster).
168.
ELSTER, supra note 167, at 440.
169.
Bruce Talbot Coram, Second Best Theories and the Implicationsfor Institutional Design, in
THE THEORY OF INSTITtUTIONAL DESIGN 92 (Robert E. Goodin, ed. 1996).
170. Id.
171.
Id.
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To apply the theory of second best to criminal justice, we must specify
what "first-best" criminal adjudication would look like. Of course, there are
no a priori optima here. The ideal method for adjudicating criminal cases
might, for instance, be inquisitorial. 172 But consistent with the adversarial
ideal long thought to be central to American criminal justice,' 3 I proceed
conservatively (in the Burkean sense) on the assumption that "optimal"
American criminal justice is what Gerard Lynch calls the "idealized model
of adversary justice described in the textbooks."' 74 Just how do the
textbooks describe adversary criminal justice? One popular high school
civics textbook identifies the "Steps of Justice": arrest, interrogation, grand
jury proceeding, trial, punishment, and appeal. 75 Or consider this from a
college American government text:
The second virtue of the adversary process is that it helps preserve
the equality of the contending parties in criminal as well as civil
cases. In criminal cases, because of the adversary process, the
government is simply one of the contending forces.... [T]he routine
of adversary proceedings do help keep the judge in the middle rather
76
than on the side of the government. 1
First-best criminal justice entails abundant, efficient trials that embody due
process ideals with well-funded counsel on all sides. The textbook model is
simplistic and artificial, and has likely never existed anywhere or at any
time. 177 Yet, in a meaningful sense, it is what the criminal justice system
professes to aim towards.
Of course, the first-best model runs headlong into the trial constraint.
The robust trials "ingredient" is unattainable, or so I have asked the reader
to assume for purposes of the thought experiment. 78 This is the starting
point for second-best analysis. It does not, however, imply that our criminal

172.

Indeed, Vermeule has suggested that adversarial criminaIjustice might be a second best, with

inquisitorial criminal justice as the first best. See Vermeule, supra note 162, at 22.
173. LANGBEIN, supra note 37, at I ("The lawyer-conducted criminal trial, our so-called adversary
system, is the defining feature of criminal justice in ...countries like the United States that are founded
on the English common law."); Epps, supra note 90, at 764 ("While few criminal cases today are
resolved through full-blown trials, the adversarial ideal nevertheless guides the entire criminal-

adjudicative process.").
174. Lynch, supra note 77, at 2121.
175. WILLIAM A. McCLENAGHAN, MAGRUDER'S AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 594 95 (Teacher's
Ed. 2009).
176. THEODORE J. Lowi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 350 (1990).

177. See Coram, supra note 169, at 92 ("[T]he first best maybe a simplified model of mechanisms
and outcomes that has been construed under certain assumptions about information or preference
revelation."); see also Feeley, supra note 2, at 344-46 (pointing out that nineteenth century criminal

trials were "perfunctory affairs that bear but scant resemblance to contemporary trials").
178.

See supra Part 1.
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justice system can, at present, be characterized as a second best; it may be a
great deal worse.
The remainder of Part IV considers the implications of applying secondbest logic applies to plea bargaining reform. The most important implication
is that it is an error for a reformer to conclude that just because some
institutional feature is worthwhile on first principles, it is necessarily
worthwhile for us. Efficient litigation might seem sensible in principle, and
it would be in a first-best system. But as we will see, it is not necessarily
sensible under second-best conditions. 179
B. Second-Best CriminalJustice: The Civil Justice Model

The objective for a "second-best" criminal procedure is to process cases
without either (very many) trials or the pathological status quo tools of
prosecutorial leverage. This Section describes such a second-best
approach-the civil justice model. The basic idea is simple: adjust criminal
procedure so that plea bargaining works more like civil settlement.
1. The Basic Model

So how can we encourage defendants and prosecutors to resolve criminal
cases without resorting to coercive prosecutorial leverage? By making the
formal litigation process inefficient-by filling it with procedural devices
that add costs-both parties in criminal cases could be dissuaded from
taking cases to trial. Policymakers could then eliminate the sources of
prosecutorial leverage without affecting the trial rate. Setting constitutional
constraints aside (for the moment), there are any number of possible
mechanisms to increase the cost of formal criminal litigation. Prosecutor's
offices could be required to pay a large "tax" to the court (in effect, an intragovernmental transfer) for cases not resolved by plea. While a defense trial
tax would likely not create useful incentives,180 the explicit trial penaltyi.e., the trial penalty fixed by law, rather than by coercive charging and pretrial detention-could be calibrated to have the equivalent effect. 81
Alternatively, litigation itself could be bloated (even more than it is) with
179. See infra Section IV.B.
180. This is because the majority of defendants are indigent. See Russell C. Gabriel, Public
Defenders, Local Control and Brown v. Boardof Education, 67 MERCER L. REV. 625, 637 (2016) ("80

percent of defendants are indigent."). The point of a trial tax would be to disincentive a party from
demanding trial, not to prohibit trials.
181. By "explicit" trial penalty, I mean a trial penalty that is set forth expressly in sentencing law.
For instance, the law might provide that when a defendant is convicted at trial, his sentence is first
calculated in the same manner as it would have been had he pleaded guilty, and then an additional 30%

(or whatever number was required to maintain the trial rate) is tacked on as the "trial penalty." See supra
notes 137 144 and accompanying text.
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inefficient procedures. And making trials expensive need not be about direct
costs. Unpredictable trials are also costly to litigants, so this strategy could
include measures that make it hard to predict trial outcomes. 182
Obviously, increasing litigation costs in criminal cases is deeply
unappealing on first principles. 83 But in exchange for inflating the cost of
litigation, reformers could eliminate the sources of prosecutorial leverage
without violating the trial constraint. If neither side of a criminal case can
credibly threaten to take a case to trial, overlapping offenses and draconian
sentencing could be relaxed without worry that the prosecutor's loss of
leverage would increase the trial rate. Whatever specific form litigation
costs might take, the point is to reduce both sides' BATNAs to the point
where settlement will almost always be in their interests. The cost of
litigation, on this approach, serves the function that overlapping offenses
and mandatory sentencing (and pre-trial detention in low-level cases) do in
the status quo. In this second-best environment, introducing inefficiencies
'
can counterintuitively make the system more efficient. 84
While this approach would not change trial rates, bargaining would look
different. As we have seen, in status quo plea bargaining, plea outcomes in
many (though not all) cases are a function of one variable-the prosecutor's
preferred level of punishment. 85 In these cases, the parties' relative
probabilities of victory at trial do not matter. In a criminal justice system
where the parties are both averse to formal litigation (but in which the
prosecutor lacks coercive levers), plea outcomes would incorporate the
parties' appraisals of the probability that the decision maker would find the
defendant legally, factually, or (more controversially) normatively
innocent. 186 The approach thus avoids one of the deep pathologies of status
quo plea bargaining. 87

182. Cf Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Needjbr a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1825 (1986) ("[T]hc
lawlessness of our [civil] jury system- -especially the largely unguided discretion that juries exercise in
assessing damages--exerts pressure for settlement on risk-averse litigants on both sides.").
183. Cf Irving R. Kaufman, JudicialReform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976)

("Legislatures, therefore, must make more stringent efforts to reduce the cost of justice and to render the
litigation process simpler and more efficient.").
184..

Cf Brown, supra note 64, at 223 ("But it can improve political decision-making

as a

Pigouvian tax can improve decision-making--to acknowledge that the price of goods with negative
externalities can be too low.").
185. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110.
186. Normative innocence is more controversial because it implicates the question of jury
nullification. The parties would be negotiating about the likelihood that a jury would acquit a defendant
it believed to be factually and legally guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On the nullification debate, see
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1683 84 (2010).

187.

There is a caveat here. There are some cases- for instance, high stakes cases where the

government has fairly weak evidence

that do go to trial now and result in acquittals, but would
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An example will illustrate. Assume that armed robbery has a statutory
maximum sentence of twenty years, with no mandatory minimum, such that
following a conviction, the judge has discretion to impose a sentence
anywhere from zero to twenty years. Prosecutor (P) and Defendant (D)
disagree about the probability of conviction at trial. P believes the
probability of conviction is 90%; D believes it is 70%. The parties agree,
however, that if D is convicted, the judge will sentence D to between twelve
and fifteen years. If litigation is costless (no attorney fees, no trial penalty,
etc.), there is no plausible settlement range. From P's perspective, the
expected outcome of trial is a range of between 10.8 and 13.5 years (i.e., the
90% chance of conviction multiplied by the 12-15 year sentencing range).
D believes the expected outcome of trial is a range of 8.4 to 10.5 years. P is
unwilling to offer anything less than 10.8 years and D will be unwilling to
accept anything higher than 10.5. Both side's BATNAs are better than a
negotiated settlement.
Now impose litigation costs. For D, assume that the law explicitly
imposes a one-third discount for pleas. For P, assume that costs can be
imposed equivalent to the utility that P receives from six years of
imprisonment. The expected "value" of trial for P falls to a range from 4.8
to 7.5 years. D still expects the outcome of trial to be between 8.4 and 10.5
years. But D also expects that if he pleads guilty without an agreement, his
sentence will be in a range from approximately 8 years to approximately 10
years (the 12-15 year range multiplied by the 33% discount). Now both
sides are better off negotiating a sentence of between 7.5 (the best P can
expect to do at trial) and 8 years (the best D can do in an open plea)."' 8
89
Litigation costs ensure that both side's BATNA is worse than negotiating.'
Making formal litigation undesirable while at the same time enacting the
sorts of reforms discussed in Part III.A-that is, eliminating overlapping
offenses and mandatory sentencing (and potentially money bail)-would
produce a regime that resembles the contractual model of plea bargaining
imagined by Easterbrook, Scott, and Stuntz."9 ° It would also resemble
probably result in plea deals favorable to the defendant in the civil justice model. Depending on one's

perspective, the status quo might be a better way of handling these outlier cases.
188.
The settlement range could be considerably bigger, moreover, if we take into account the
parties' attitudes toward risk.

189.

With a larger plea discount, it could easily become the case that the defendant's dominant

option is to plead without an agreement. In our example, if the plea discount was 75%, D would expect
a sentence of between and 3 and 3.75 years if he pleads guilty without an agreement. As P will refuse

any settlement offer below 4.8 years (the worst P can expect to do at trial), D's best choice would be an
open plea. While "open pleas" are not negotiated settlements, they nonetheless avoid trial, and so abide
the trial constraint.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 7G 80. To be sure, making trials undesirable to both sides
would not solve plea bargaining's implementation problems. See supra notes 82 85 and accompanying
text (describing critiques of plea bargaining focused on problems of implementation). In particular, the
principal-agent problems that mar contemporary plea bargaining would remain, especially if indigent
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segments of civil litigation. 9 While comparing civil and criminal
settlement rates is a fraught exercise,' 92 it is noteworthy that civil and
' Yet civil litigation lacks
criminal cases settle at roughly comparable rates. 93
(in many, albeit not all, cases) 194 any analogue to the overlapping offenses
and mandatory sentencing that drive plea bargaining. With no party able to
deploy extreme leverage, why do so few civil cases make it to trial? Scholars
offer a range of explanations, "' but civil litigation's expense plays a leading
role. To take an extreme example, few will take a contract dispute with
$50,000 in controversy to judgment if the attorney fees are expected to be
$60,000.196 The expense compels settlement in lieu of trial. And while
distributional concerns in civil settlement are important,197 civil plaintiffs
and defendants negotiate on far more equal terms than do criminal
prosecutors and defendants. 9 8
2. Approximating the Model
But how can formal criminal litigation be made more inefficient, not
setting aside constitutional constraints? The criminal trial itself is already
famously slow and costly; 9 9 slowing it down even more seems unlikely.
defense remains underfunded. My aim is to work through problems of plea bargaining design using
second best theory. Implementation questions are important, but beyond my scope.
Cf Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84 GEO.
191.
L.J. 61, 62 (1995) ("Equalizing discovery costs eliminates distortions in bargaining power between the
parties and promotes fairness.").
192. One reason comparing civil and criminal settlement rates is fraught is that many civil disputes
are resolved between the parties prior to litigation. Such disputes do not show up in court statistics at all.
By contrast, subject to narrow exceptions, criminal matters almost always require some judicial process.
The implication is that official court statistics likely undercount civil compared to criminal settlements.
193. Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1660 (2017).
194. To be sure, sometimes civil litigation is rife with leverage. In a "strike suit" or "nuisance
suit," a civil claim is asserted "for the purpose of coercing a settlement rather than obtaining judicial
relief." Paul A. LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Frameworkfor
Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1040 (1982). This is obviously not the kind of civil litigation to which
I look as a model.
195. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 515- 20 (2004) (identifying causes of civil
trial decline). As Galantcr observes, "going to trial has become more costly as litigation has become
more technical, complex, and expensive." Id. at 517.
196. In law and economics, these are known as "negative expected value" claims. See generally
Lucian Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected- Value Suits, in PROCEDURAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 341-48 (Chris Sanchirico, ed. 2011). The logic of negative expected value claims is
discussed infra notes 228 234 and accompanying text.
197. Owen M. Fiss, Commentary, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1077 78 (1984).
198. Gold et al., supra note 193, at 1659.
199. See LANGBEIN, supra note 37, at 9 ("In the two centuries from the mid-eighteenth to the midtwentieth, a vast transformation overcame the Anglo-American institution of criminal jury trial,
rendering it absolutely unworkable as an ordinary dispositive procedure .... "); see also William J.
Stuntz, The PoliticalConstitutionof CriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 802 (2006) ("The law of
criminal procedure makes criminal trials more expensive than they otherwise would be."); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury
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Yet there are opportunities to introduce inefficiencies on trial's front-endby introducing civil litigation-style discovery and motions-and its backend-by providing more opportunities for interlocutory appeals.
The pre-trial phase of criminal litigation could be a lot heftier. Unlike in
civil litigation, where motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions
are major milestones in a case, pre-trial motions on the merits (as
distinguished from suppression motions) rarely factor into criminal
litigation.2 Commentators have proposed giving motions to dismiss a more
prominent role in criminal litigation, 0° creating a new summary judgment
stage,2" 2 or both. 0 3 As a recent article by Russell Gold, Carissa Byrne
Hessick, and F. Andrew Hessick proposes, defendants "could move for
summary judgment, which would require the government to demonstrate
with evidence that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant satisfied every element of the crime." 2 4 This proposal
sets the standard for a defensive summary judgment motion at the same
level as a federal motion for judgment of acquittal,2 5 but a more demanding
standard is conceivable. Thejudge, for example, could be instructed to grant
summary judgment on a defendant's motion unless the government's
evidence would render a conviction "appropriate," giving the judge more
2°6
leeway to consider normative questions and matters of credibility.
Moreover, although the Sixth Amendment precludes prosecutors from
seeking offensive summary judgment on the ultimate question of whether
the defendant is guilty, it would not preclude prosecutorial motions for
summary judgment on a defendant's affirmative defenses. 2 7 Drafting and
responding to dispositive motions is time-consuming and expensive. 208 If

Verdicts, 56 U. CHL L. REV. 153, 155 (1989) ("Our mistrust ofthc jurors whom we extol has ledus to

surround the criminal trial with an extraordinarily expensive and cumbersome collection of courtroom
procedures.").
200. See Gold et al.,
supra note 193, at 1642 43; James M. Burnham, Why Don't Courts Dismiss
Indictments?, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 348 (2015).
201.
Burnham, supra note 200.
202. Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes: A Proposalfor Deensive Summary
Judgment in Criminal Cases, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 691 94 (2011).
203.
Gold et al., supra note 193, at 1642 43.
204. Id. at 1648.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 959 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("In considering a
motion for the entry of a judgment of acquittal, a district court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.") (internal quotation omitted) (citing United States v. Sellers, 871
F.2d 1019, 1021 (11 th Cir. 1989)).
206. This would, to be sure, depart somewhat from the civil litigation analogy.
207. Gold et al., supra note 193, at 1649.
208.
John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 535 (2007)
("Drafting these motions and the responses to them is a crucial part of the lawyers' work ....[Plarties

are willing to pay lawyers to spend massive numbers of hours drafting and revising these long, detailed
motions on which the outcome of the litigation turns.").
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one's goal is to make criminal litigation more costly, and thereby to
dissuade trials, expanding pre-trial motions practice makes good sense.
But if one wished to really boost the cost of pre-trial criminal litigation,
the discovery process is the place to look. The core tools of civil
discovery-interrogatories, requests for the production of documents, and
depositions-are largely unknown in criminal litigation in most American
jurisdictions, 20 9 a gap that many observers have urged policymakers to
close.2 10 Discovery is, of course, a major source of litigation costs in civil
litigation.2 11 Responding to interrogatories and requests for the production
21 2
of documents is burdensome, as is preparing witnesses for depositions.
The higher discovery costs go, the more parties want to avoid them by
21 3
settling.
While I am certainly not the first to suggest expanding motions practice
and discovery in criminal litigation, there are important distinctions between
this proposal and those that have come before. First consider expanded
motions practice. Prior proposals to create a summary judgment stage in
criminal cases are premised on the value of judges' decisions on these
motions. Thus, Gold and his coauthors argue that the principal virtue of
dispositive motions in criminal cases is that they would "provide the court
209. See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2014) ("In civil litigation, these powers take the form of depositions,
interrogatories, and document requests. A criminal defendant, however, is rarely afforded such tools.").
210. Gold et al., supra note 193, at 1645 -48; Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea
Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61 (2015); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the JudicialRole in
CriminalPlea and Sentence Bargaining,84 TEX. L. REV. 2023 (2006).
211. See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Civil Justice at A Crossroads, 11 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 3, 9
(2010) ("The ABA, ACTL, and NELA surveys also asked about discovery costs, and more than 70% of
respondents in all three surveys indicated their belief that it was too expensive."); John H.
Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Refbrm, 60 DUKE L.J. 547,
549 (2010) ("[P]retrial discovery process is broadly viewed as dysfunctional, with litigants utilizing
discovery excessively and abusively."); Michael Boudin, The Real Roles of'Judges, 86 B.U. L. REV.
1097, 1097 (2006) ("On the civil side, the courts have become victims of their own success in making
litigation so 'fair' through discovery 'reforms' as to be both expensive and slow."); Thomas E. Willging
et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 547 48 & tbl.4 (1997) ("Among attorneys reporting discovery
expenses, the proportion of litigation expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly close to 50
[percent] .... Half estimated that discovery accounted for 25 [percent] to 70 [percent] of litigation
expenses.").
212. See Bronsteen, supra note 208, at 534- 35 (explaining high costs of document review,
producing and responding to interrogatories and requests for production, and depositions in civil cases).
213. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not
Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, I J. EMP. L. STUD. 943, 950 (2004) ("Discovery leads
to a decline in trials because it both produces information and requires continued investment."); AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., Final Report on
the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute
.fbrthe Advancement of the American Legal System 9 (2009), http://www. uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
final report onjthe-joint project of the actl task force on discovery and the iaals 1.pdf ("Fewer
than half of the respondents thought that our discovery system works well and 71% thought that
discovery is used as a tool to force settlement.").
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an opportunity to weigh in on the merits of the case... which may help the
parties' view of the case converge and thus facilitate settlement," and
further, that the "ability to challenge legal theories would also tend to clarify
the law for future cases, which would facilitate future plea bargaining."214
These are important benefits, but note that they accrue only if judges
actually rule on summary judgment motions. On the other hand, if the
parties settle before filing these motions in order to avoid an expensive
litigation process (of which the motions are a part), they are elusive.2" 5 For
my purposes, it does not matter whether judges actually decide many
summary judgment motions. Rather, the key benefit of adding a summary
judgment stage to criminal procedure is that it augments the litigants'
216
incentives to settle.

Likewise with discovery. Previous proposals to enhance criminal
21 7
discovery have centered on "levelling] the investigative playing field.
The asymmetry of information in criminal cases is a major problem, as
many have observed. 2" Given the existing imbalance, if defendants took
advantage of new discovery tools, that could have a levelling effect. Of
course, if defendants traded away expanded discovery rights for sentencing
concessions, the rights would impact the price of pleas but not the symmetry
of information. 21 9 On the traditional justification for expanded discovery,
that is a problem. It is not a problem for my purposes, because the additional
tools in the discovery toolkit would still give the parties more reason to
settle.
214.

Gold et al., supra note 193, at 1642, 1650.

215.

Gold and his coauthors recognize this point, observing that "[s]o long as the procedures are

waivable, prosecutors will likely seek waivers of those procedures as part of the plea bargain." Id. at

1653. And they are appropriately sanguine about the viability of formal bars on defendants waiving
procedural rights. Id. at 1654 ("[Waiver-bans] would likely not prevent all waivers. Prosecutors and
defendants could work together to avoid these limits on waivers by negotiating before charges have been
filed.").
216. To be sure, the more straightforward benefits that Gold and his coauthors identify are -one
hopes- politically sellable.
217. Grunwald, supra note 52, at 773.
218. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) ("Criminal

defendants often know less about the government's case than the government itself, and their only means
for determining the weakness of the government's case is by proceeding to trial. Since most defendants

lack the resources and fortitude to seek this option, criminal discovery's information asymmetry severely
undermines the integrity and reliability of the plea-bargaining process."); see also Laurent Sacharoff&
Sarah Lustbader, Wno Should Own Police Body Camera Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 293 (2017)

("This asymmetry exacerbates the inequities of the criminal justice system when it comes to access to
information and discovery .... ); Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive
Psychology and Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 234 (2007) ("Limited discovery in criminal

trials is a longstanding feature of criminal law that reflects and responds to the fundamental asymmetries
of criminal litigation.").
219.

See Grunwald, supra note 52, at 804 ("The first is that one defendant's right to discovery is

another's right to exchange it for lenience. Thus, particularly if the plea-trial differential represents a
plea discount, open-file could help guilty defendants obtain more lenient sentences simply by giving

them a valuable bargaining chip to trade away.").
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So far I have considered mechanisms that would make pre-trial criminal
litigation more like pre-trial civil litigation. In civil litigation, the costs of
dispositive motions practice and discovery contribute to the nearelimination of trials. But that may not suffice to maintain a criminal trial
rate close to zero. Settlement-promoting inefficiencies can also be added by
creating more opportunities for interlocutory appeals.
In the federal system and most states, prosecutors are entitled to take an
220
interlocutory appeal from an order suppressing material evidence.
Perhaps the quickest way to stultify trials would be to liberalize who can
take an interlocutory appeal and from what orders. This goes beyond
anything in civil litigation, where the final judgment rule applies,2 2' but if a
prosecutor or defendant could halt trial proceedings every time the judge
makes an ordinary evidentiary ruling with which she disagrees, or whenever
the judge determines to give a jury instruction contrary to what she has
proposed, inefficiency would flourish. Indeed, that is why courts ordinarily
disallow interlocutory appeals. As Justice Frankfurter wrote for the
Supreme Court in United States v. Cobbledick, the "momentum" of a case
would be "arrested by permitting separate reviews of the component
elements in a unified case.- 222 "To be effective," Frankfurter explained,
"judicial administration must not be leaden-footed., 223 Following
Frankfurter, if the final judgment rule makes the administration of justice
"effective," then liberalizing interlocutory appeals should make the (formal)
administration of criminal justice ineffective.
Both on the front and back end of trial, criminal litigation could be made
significantly more inefficient than it is now. It is worth reiterating that
inefficiency is not an intrinsic value of the civil justice model of criminal
justice reform. Its value is instrumental. Making the formal litigation
process costlier makes it possible for policymakers to dismantle the tools of
prosecutorial leverage-overlapping offenses, draconian sentencing laws,
and so on-without increasing the trial rate. While litigation in a first-best
world would surely be efficient, inefficiency is a second-best response to a
world in which the trial constraint must be abided.
There are two further wrinkles to consider. First, the civil justice model
depends on the existence of criminal defense lawyers who can credibly
220.

18 U.S.C. § 3731; § 27.3(c), 7 Crim. Proc. § 27.3(c) (4th ed.) ("The fcdcral government and

most states have adopted legislation providing for review of suppression orders as a matter of right.").
This is because the government cannot ask an appellate court to review the suppression order after a

final judgment, as the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a government appeal from an acquittal. See
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 (1978).
221. See generally Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of
Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 176 (2001) (explaining final judgment rule).
222. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)
223. Id.
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threaten to use the expanded motions, discovery, and interlocutory appeals.
To succeed, that means, the civil justice model would require adequate
funding of indigent defense. 2 4 In a world of underfunded indigent defense,
that may not be realistic. 25 Is that a fatal blow to the civil justice model?
Not necessarily. If the trial constraint is grounded in minimizing costs, then
perhaps we should not expect policymakers to adequately fund indigent
defense. 226 But I suggested above that the trial constraint may not be just
about minimizing costs. 227 Rather, it may be that policymakers prefer to

avoid trials because that means the government never (or rarely) suffers the
embarrassment of losing. If that is the underlying motivation for the trial
constraint, then while increasing the trial rate is off the table, adequately
funding indigent defense is not. In the civil justice model, indigent defense
could be funded without materially increasing the government's risk of
losing.
The second wrinkle is that defendants, imbued with new opportunities to
file motions and receive discovery, might be less willing to settle, and thus
force prosecutors to either try more cases or dismiss valid charges. The logic
is as follows: Defendants will know that if they refuse to settle, prosecutors
will face expensive motions and discovery practice (in addition to trial
costs). Defendants will also know that in many cases-particularly less
serious cases-it would not be worth the prosecutor's efforts to incur these
expenses in order to secure any particular conviction. In law and economics
terminology, enhanced motions and discovery would mean that more
criminal cases have "negative expected value" (NEV) to prosecutors. The
law and economics literature on NEV claims rebuts that logic. Readers not
interested in a detour through that literature, however, would be welladvised to skip ahead to Part IV.C now. The main story picks up there.
An NEV claim exists where the expected value of a judgment is less than
it would cost the claimant to litigate to judgment. 28 Armed with the
knowledge that his case is NEV for the prosecutor, a defendant in a lowlevel criminal case might call the prosecutor's bluff by insisting on trial. If
so, the civil justice approach to reform would increase the trial rate and, on
my own logic, must be rejected. The law and economics literature on NEV
civil claims shows why this possibility is unrealistic.

224.

I am grateful to Jon Weinberg for emphasizing this point.

225.

There is an enormous literature on the crisis of indigent defense funding. See, e.g., Mary Sue

Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
1031, 1045 -46 (2006); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, TriagingAppointed- Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 972 77 (2012).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 36- 38.
227. See supra text accompanying note 40.
228. Bebchuk & Klement, supra note 196, at 341.
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Early law and economics models puzzled over why civil defendants do
not tell plaintiffs with NEV claims to pound sand.2 29 More sophisticated
models demonstrate that under realistic conditions, plaintiffs with NEV
claims can extract positive-value settlements from defendants, and that this
is often welfare-enhancing. 230 At least two of the conditions that enable
plaintiffs to settle NEV claims would be implicated by the civil justice
model.
First, "the divisibility of the litigation process can provide a plaintiff with
a credible threat, and enable it to extract a settlement, even if the plaintiff is
known by the defendant to have an NEV suit. '231 Civil litigation is
"divisible" in the sense that defendants do not expend their litigation costs
in one shot, but rather spread them over the course of a dispute. Criminal
cases operate in an analogous manner. The criminal defendant's principal
analogue to the civil defendant's litigation costs is the trial penalty. Just as
civil defendants' total expenditures rise as they sink deeper into litigation,
so too can criminal defendants' trial penalty. The formal plea discount
works just this way in the federal system. Under the federal sentencing
guidelines, a defendant who "demonstrates acceptance of responsibility"code for pleading guilty-reduces his offense level by two points.232 If he
accepts responsibility early in the case, "thereby permitting the government
to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to
allocate their resources efficiently, ' 23 3 he can receive an additional one point
off. Criminal defendants' litigation costs are thus, like civil defendants'
litigation costs, divisible.
Second, repeat players have built-in credibility in asserting NEV claims:
"If any one of the parties is a repeat player, this party might develop a
reputation that would might enable it to bind itself to take a different course
of action than the one that it would be expected to take in the case of one-

229.
230.

Id.
A related but analytically separate question is why defendants plea bargain at all, given that

prosecutors lack the capacity totake more than a small fraction of their cases to trial. See Oren Bar-Gill
& Omri Ben-Shahar, The Prisoners' (Plea Bargain) Dilemma, I J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 737 (2009).

According to Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, because defendants lack a cooperation mechanism, prosecutors
can adopt a divide-and-conquer strategy. Id. at 754 ("As long as prosecutors are able to identify
sequencing strategies and other divide-and-conquer strategies and make it publicly known that they
subscribe to these orderings, they will be able to bargain with each defendant as if they have a credible

threat to take this defendant to trial."). This would remain the case in the civil justice model.
231.
Bebchuk & Klement, supra note 196, at 343 (citing Lucien A. Bebchuk, A New Theory
Concerningthe Credibilityand Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9(1996)).
232. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2018);
Covey, supra note 137, at 1245 n.30 ("The Guidelines incorporate an approximately 25-35% fixed

discount for 'acceptance ofresponsibility,' universally understood to serve as code language for pleading
guilty.").
233.

USSG§3EI.I(b).
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shot litigation.- 234 Prosecutors are the ultimate repeat players. While it
might not be worth a prosecutor's effort to go through with motions practice
and discovery to obtain any particular low-level conviction, she must
maintain a reputation for being willing to do so. And because defendants
know that, they would be unlikely to call the prosecutor's "bluff," even in
low level cases that the prosecutor would rather not spend the time on.
C. Alternative Second Best. The Administrative Enforcement Model
The civil justice model is not the only strategy for achieving a near-zero
trial rate without using overlapping offenses and draconian sentencing to
coerce guilty pleas. An alternative second best approach is to minimize the
defendant's active participation in the adjudicative process. There are a
number of ways in principle that this could work. As in the current criminal
justice system, law enforcement officers could bring their investigations to
prosecutors for an up or down decision. Today the prosecutor decides
whether to charge the suspect or decline prosecution. 235 Instead, the
prosecutor's decision could be whether to convict and sentence. Or it could
be whether to convict, with the sentencing decision moving to the judge. Or
the conviction itself could be "reviewable" by a judge, perhaps in the
deferential manner by which administrative enforcement matters are subject
to judicial review. 236 The precise details are unimportant for present
purposes. The point is that in principle, a system could be constructed that
processes cases without trials, but also without requiring defendants to
actively convict themselves.2 37
Most readers will understandably recoil at this approach-which for
convenience I call the "administrative enforcement" second best. I certainly
agree that giving prosecutors unilateral control over convictions is
distasteful. Even so, I argue in Part IV.C. 1, the approach would plausibly be
better than the status quo in many cases, though that says more about the
pathology of the status quo than anything else. 38 In Part IV.C.2, however,
I show that it lacks something that the civil justice model offers-a longrun pathway to first-best criminal justice. 39
234.
Bebchuk & Klement, supra note 196, at 346.
235. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 130 (2008).
236. Cf Lynch, supra note 77, at 2135 ("In this system, the formal adversarial jury trial serves as
a kind ofjudicial review, in which a defendant who is not content with the administrative adjudication

by the prosecutor has a right to de novo review of the decision in another forum.").
237. Strictly speaking, such a system would not be a plea bargaining regime at all, as it would
involve no bargaining.
238.
239.

See inira Section IV.C.I.
See infra Section IV.C.2. It has surely not missed the reader's notice that as described in the

text, the model is flagrantly unconstitutional. Because I conclude that the administrative enforcement
model is inferior to the civil justice one, see inra Section IV.C.2, I will not tcstthc reader's patience
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1. Comparisonto Status Quo

Why do I say that the administrative enforcement approach could be
preferable to the status quo? The core point here is that because of their
outsized leverage in plea bargaining, prosecutors already unilaterally
adjudicate guilt in many cases.24 ° The administrative enforcement approach
would make the prosecutor's unilateral determination of guilt de jure
while-and here is its advantage-relieving defendants of the obligation of
convicting themselves.
But wait, the reader may be thinking, does this "model" eliminate the
opportunity for advocacy by defense lawyers? Not entirely. It could,
however, entail changing the lawyer's role from adversary to lobbyist.
Depending on the system's details, the defense lawyer's core function in the
administrative enforcement second best might be to try to persuade the
prosecutor not to bring charges, or to bring lesser ones. For some
defendants-especially those who can afford aggressive lawyers-this
would be a disadvantageous change. Still, the change in role is perhaps not
as momentous as it appears. In the status quo world of excessive
prosecutorial leverage, the criminal defense lawyer's function is sometimes
already closer to lobbyist than adversary. As Lynch observes, "the defense
attorney who wishes to have any influence over the inquisitorial process of
the prosecutor is largely limited to the power of persuasion." 241
with a lengthy discussion of how to approximate the administrative enforcement model in a
constitutionally acceptable form. It does bear mention that a specific reform making inroads in some
jurisdictions- mediation of guilty pleas by judges may point in that direction. In an important recent
article, Nancy King and Ronald Wright identify a variety of mechanisms by which trial judges manage
their dockets, sevcral of which place the judge in the role of "mediator" of pleas. Nancy J. King &
Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial
Participationin Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 351-55 (2016). King and Wright's interviews with
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges yield evidence suggesting that that the judicial mediation
process, while not "coercive" in a traditional sense, id. at 383, exerts pressures on defendants and defense
lawyers to be "reasonable" by accepting a resolution short of trial. See id. at 343 & n.99. One judge, for
example, commented on the pressure to be "reasonable" in settlement conferences: "If there is an
unreasonable defense practitioner who is looking to jam up the system, wanting to have as many cases
set for trial or push things as far as they can to gum up the works, the judge is able to impact things
then." Id. at 367 (emphasis added). Recall that the primary quality of the administrative enforcement
model is that it does not require the defendant to play an active role in his own conviction. This judge's
comment raises the prospect that judicial mediation may propagate anti-trial norms that encourage
defendants to passively accept mediated pleas. If so, widespread judicial mediation of pleas could mean
that prosecutors set the terms of discussion (and the fact of conviction) via their charging decisions, with
judges-as-mediators then adjusting the terms likely, if King and Wright's findings are generalizable,
in a somewhat lenient direction. See id. at 371 72. If that is how judicial mediation plays out, it would
be a reasonable approximation of the administrative enforcement model.
240. See supra Section ll.B.2.
241. Lynch, supra note 77, at 2125. Indeed, the administrative enforcement second best is, in
many respects, similar to the vision of plea bargaining that Lynch defends, but with one important
difference. For Lynch, it is important that "the de facto administrative process operates within the shell
ofthe due process model," such that "defendants retain the power to opt out of that process and submit
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Even if the administrative enforcement model is less of a departure than
it might first appear for defense lawyers, there is still the matter of
prosecutors and police. Wouldn't they be less careful about screening cases
ina world in which there was no (or reduced, depending on the details)
adversarial check on their decisions?242 This is a possible, but not necessary,
consequence. The administrative enforcement approach would reduce
"legal" checks on prosecutorial screening. Specifically it would eliminate
the probable cause charging standard (which applies in most
jurisdictions)2 43 and the beyond a reasonable doubt conviction standard
(which applies in all). Yet in the contemporary plea bargaining regime,
these legal checks do very little to ensure screening. In a previous paper, I
argued that the anemic and largely unenforceable probable cause standard
exacerbates the pathologies of plea bargaining. 2" The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard for convictions, moreover, does little work in a criminal
justice system that uses prosecutorial leverage to compel pleas before
trial.245
The impetus for police and prosecutorial screening in the contemporary
criminal justice system comes from professional norms and standards as
much as, if not more than, external regulation.246 As Marc Miller and Ronald
Wright observed about the New Orleans screening attorneys they studied,
prosecutors decline "some charges in an effort to interpret the criminal law
faithfully, even when there is no reason to believe that some other interpreter
stands ready to overturn the prosecutor's choice. ' 247 The administrative
enforcement approach would abrogate external enforcement that is of
questionable significance, but it need not annul professional norms
surrounding police and prosecutorial screening. Indeed, by eliminating the
fiction that probable cause and beyond a reasonable doubt are back-end
checks on such screening, it could even strengthen those norms. 4 a
themselves instead to a formal judicial procedure that is bound strictly by due process rules." Id. at 2144
45. There may be less of a due process backstop in the administrative enforcement second best, but as a
practical matter there is not much ofa backstop in the status quo plea bargaining regime either. See supra
Part I.
242.
Cf Alschuler, supra note 90, at 922 ("A legal system in which a prosecutor could convict
whomever he liked just by pointing could lead to conviction in cases in which the prosecutor had no
evidence at all. The system would be even more effective than ours in producing wrongful

convictions.").
243.
See Ortman, supra note 18, at 546.
244. Id. at 558 -60.
245. See Albert W. Alschuler, Strainingat Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality
ofProjessorBibas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1412, 1413 14 (2003) ("The plea bargaining system effectively

substitutes a concept of partial guilt for the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
246.

See generally Miller & Wright, supra note 235.

247.

Id. at 154.

248.
Cf Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Errorin Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1124 (2015) ("[lIjt's possible that a system less formally committed to protecting the innocent might

actually do a betterjob of minimizing false convictions.") (emphasis omitted).
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To be sure, the normative case for the administrative enforcement
approach over the status quo is not a slam dunk. Prosecutors are not
unilateral price-setters in every status quo case, after all.249 In weak cases
defendants have some negotiating power, which they would lose in the
administrative enforcement model. Perhaps, as I have suggested, some of
these weak cases would not have been brought in the first place, but some
surely would, and those defendants would be worse off than they are now.
My point, however, is not that the administrative enforcement model is
Pareto superior to the status quo. It isn't. My modest aim is to show that the
model is plausibly better than the status quo in many cases. That the
comparison is even possible condemns the status quo.
2. Comparisonto the Civil Justice Model
It is at least plausible that the administrative enforcement model would
be preferable to the status quo in a range of cases. Why then, did I devote
the lion's share of Part IV to the civil justice model? The administrative
enforcement model has a significant downside when compared to the civil
justice model. In Part I, I asked the reader to accept the premise that the trial
constraint is a fact of life in the short and medium runs. I excluded the long
run from the request. The day may come when policymakers are ready for
more trials. That prospect makes the civil justice model preferable to the
administrative enforcement model.
The civil justice model is premised on injecting costly procedures into
criminal adjudication to make trials unattractive to both sides. Moving from
that world to a first-best world-one in which trials are available at least in
cases where there is a serious question about whether the defendant is
guilty-becomes a matter of eliminating the costly trial-avoiding
procedures, which can be done incrementally. So long as that is not
accompanied by a return of prosecutorial leverage, the likely effect would
be an increase in the trial rate.
The administrative enforcement model, on the other hand, is more
binary. Either defendants play an active part in criminal adjudication or they
do not. In the administrative enforcement model, they would not, and no
incremental reform from that baseline could increase trial rates on the
margins. The administrative enforcement model is thus a one-way door.
Opening it means closing the door on a first-best criminal justice system,
not only in the short and medium runs, but in the long run as well.

249.

See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

I have asked the reader to indulge a plausible but unprovable
assumption-that trials are not vanishing, but vanished-and then to ask
how best we might conduct criminal adjudication in a post-trial world. I
conclude by attempting to make the payoffs of this thought experiment
concrete.
Part IV identified two models of plea bargaining reform that could
preserve a low trial rate while shedding the status quo of its reliance on
excessive prosecutorial leverage. One would harness inefficient procedures
to make litigation unattractive to both parties. The other would formally
empower prosecutors to determine guilt. I labored in Part IV to show that
either model could be better than the status quo. But I made no claim that
either model would be good enough, much less that it would be just. Let me
be clear-neither would.
The second-best models are far from the normative ideals of American
criminal justice.25 ° My hope is that the reader finds it disturbing that
criminal procedure might be better if trials were prohibitively expensive or
if prosecutors could unilaterally convict defendants. For me, that is grounds
for despair about the status quo of criminal adjudication.
But despair is not the thought experiment's only payoff; there is a more
constructive angle as well. That the possible second bests are normatively
inadequate is evidence that the trial constraint stands between us and a just
system for adjudicating criminal cases. The trial constraint is a function of
" ' A clear-eyed understanding of secondpolitics, and politics can change. 25
best criminal justice-including the tradeoffs that it requires-might even
help.

250. See supratext accompanying notes 174 176.
251.
Cf William H. Riker, Implicationsfrom the Disequilibriumof Majority Rulejbr the Study of
Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 446 (1980) ("[I]n the long run, nearly anything can happen in
politics.").

